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## US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF FORMING A NEW WORLD ORDER

*Abstract*

Today, dramatic motives prevail in assessments of the current international political situation. The picture is often painted truly apocalyptic: the world is entering a new era, the main features of which are the dominance of offensive nationalism, the rejection of formal and informal imperatives of behavior in the international arena, the erosion of constraints, dangerous balancing, the increasing uncertainty, the general rejection of the game by the rules and as a result - increased risks and unpredictability.

In this article, all these dangers are taken into account, but are not considered as something immanently inherent in the modern international system and even more so dooming it to inevitable collapse. Some new parameters are really being formed in it - but it is important to look, firstly, at their substantive side, and, secondly, at their consequences for development on the global arena, for the behavior of participants in international life, and for the state of their relationship. Perhaps the international system really needs to be replaced - although this still needs to be justified and an appropriate estimate made. However, it is possible that something else is necessary: to find out exactly what its vulnerability to in the face of emerging problems and how to increase its resistance, stability, ability to solve them. It does not always make sense to reduce everything to the complete collapse of what is, and its total replacement by something that did not exist before.

**Key words:** world order, international system, US-Russia relations, US foreign policy, Russian foreign policy, bipolarity, polycentrism, balance of power, international hierarchy.

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## АҚШ – ҚЫТАЙ АРАСЫНДАҒЫ «САУДА СОҒЫСЫ» «ЖАҢА ҚЫРҒИҚАБАҚ СОҒЫС» КӨРІНІСІ РЕТІНДЕ

*Аңдатпа*

Қазіргі кездегі халықаралық саяси жағдайды бағалауда драматикалық қорытындылау басым. Жағдай көбінесе шынайы апокалиптикалық бояумен боялған: әлем жаңа дәуірге аяқ басты, оның басты белгілері - қорлаушыл ұлтшылдықтың үстемдігі, халықаралық аренадағы іс-әрекеттің ресми және бейресми императивтерінен бас тарту, шектеулердің жойылуы, қауіпті тепе-теңдік, өсіп келе жатқан белгісіздік, қалыптасқан ережелерге сәйкес ойыннан бас тарту және нәтижесінде тәуекелділіктің жоғарылауы және оларды болжау мүмкіндігінің жоқтығы. Осы мақалада аталған барлық қауіптер ескеріле отырып, оларды қазіргі халықаралық жүйеге тән немесе оны сөзсіз күйреуге ұшырататын имманентті жағдай ретінде қарастырмайды. Онда кейбір жаңа параметрлер қалыптасуда - бірақ, біріншіден, олардың маңыздылық жағына, екіншіден, олардың әлемдік аренада дамуының салдарына, халықаралық өмірге қатысушылардың мінез-құлқына және олардың қарым-қатынастарына қарау маңызды. Мүмкін халықаралық жүйені шынымен ауыстыру керек шығар, дегенмен бұл әлі де дәлелденіп, тиісті баға берілуі керек. Алайда, тағы бір нәрсе қажет болуы мүмкін: туындайтын проблемалар алдында оның осалдығы неде екенін және оның қарсыласуын, тұрақтылығын, оларды шешу қабілетін қалай арттыруға болатындығын білу. Бәрін бұрыннан болмаған нәрсені толығымен ығыстыру және оны толығымен ауыстыру әрдайым мағынаны бермейді.

**Кілт сөздер:** әлемдік тәртіп, халықаралық жүйе, Ресей-Америка қарым-қатынасы, АҚШ-тың сыртқы саясаты, Ресейдің сыртқы саясаты, биполярлық, полицентризм, күш тепе-теңдігі, халықаралық иерархия.

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## **РОССИЙСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ В РАМКАХ СТАНОВЛЕНИЯ НОВОГО МИРОПОРЯДКА**

### *Аннотация*

Сегодня в оценках современной международно-политической обстановки преобладают драматические мотивы. Картину зачастую рисуют поистине апокалиптическую: мир вступает в новую эпоху, главными особенностями которой становятся доминирование наступательного национализма, отказ от формальных и неформальных императивов поведения на международной арене, эрозия сдерживающих факторов, опасное балансирование, усиливающаяся неопределенность, всеобщий отказ от игры по правилам и как результат — повышенные риски и непредсказуемость. В настоящей статье все указанные опасности принимаются во внимание, однако не рассматриваются как нечто имманентно присущее современной международной системе и тем более обрекающее ее на неизбежный крах. В ней действительно формируются некие новые параметры — но важно посмотреть, во-первых, на их содержательную сторону, и, во-вторых, на их последствия для развития на мировой арене, для поведения участников международной жизни, для состояния их взаимоотношений. Возможно, международная система действительно требует замены — хотя это еще надо обосновать и составить соответствующую смету. Однако не исключено, что необходимо совсем иное: выяснить, в чем именно ее уязвимость перед лицом возникающих проблем и как повысить ее резистентность, устойчивость, способность к их решению. Далеко не всегда имеет смысл сводить все к полному обрушению того, что есть, и его тотальному замещению чем-то не существовавшим ранее.

**Ключевые слова:** миропорядок, международная система, Российско-Американские отношения, внешняя политика США, внешняя политика России, биполярность, полицентризм, баланс сил, международная иерархия.

### **SYSTEMATIC LEVEL CHALLENGES**

(i) A remarkable feature of the modern international system is the gradual softening of its internal hierarchy. Today we see how it is gradually becoming more and more varied and multifaceted, it is subject to various kinds of fluctuations. “Ranking” in international affairs is not determined by the once and for all fixed pattern - as it would be, say, in a unipolar world. A non-rigid system can change its configuration and structure, line up differently depending on many circumstances. This can, for example,

be influenced by the characteristics of the specific sphere in question; the balance of forces in it (and in other areas); the nature of the relationship between the states involved; exposure to other contributing factors. This in itself is a rather controversial phenomenon - because the internal hierarchy forms the core, the skeleton of any systemic formation, and its erosion, it would seem, puts it at risk. The “kaleidoscopic” nature of the hierarchy in international relations can be a source of tension, creating the potential for instability both at the global level and in individual regional segments of the world system. But this circumstance gives the latter additional flexibility and makes it easier to adapt to new problem situations.

The emergence of a more labile hierarchy does not necessarily become the prevailing characteristic of the international system. It is unlikely that there will be talk of an irreversible phenomenon. Here, presumably, two factors will turn out to be a key factor - the general structuring of international relations, as well as the growth of economic and political interdependence. Of course, it is important not to harbor too much illusion. Even if the international system gains more flexibility and variability, there is hardly any reason to believe that there will be less problematic situations and acute conflicts to which it should respond. All the reasons why they arose earlier will continue to generate them.

However, if we consider the specified dynamics in the most general terms, we can assume that the main intrigue will begin to unfold along two trajectories. The first concerns the establishment of a new configuration and balance of power at the global and regional levels. The second is “center-periphery” relations across their widest spectrum (including here technologies, information, resources, financial instruments, human capital, movement of people, security, etc.) The challenge that arises today for the participants in international life is to adjust the global balance of the system in combination with maintaining the complex and contradictory dynamics of relations within its regional segments.

(ii) The problems caused by the current or possible future international-political delimitations of the system level will not disappear anywhere. They have already been mentioned above. In the one that goes along the Russia-West line, different factors come together - both indicative of mutual dissatisfaction regarding the course of development after the end of the Cold War, and stemming from geopolitical rivalry, and related to internal political dynamics. The range of issues on which there is a mutual rejection of the parties tends to expand - from NATO's eastward movement, rivalry for the post-Soviet space, events in Ukraine and the situation in Syria. The cooperative part of the spectrum of possible relationships becomes marginal and almost taboo. The chances of her promotion have not disappeared at all, but they are becoming less and less. And there is no particular hope that the situation will succeed if desired, when a political impulse arises, to rectify quickly and with little effort. Mutual trust is lost easily, and acquired hard and long [1].

Another dividing line at the system level was designated between China, on the one hand, and the United States with its allies (primarily Asian), on the other hand. It can become an even more significant marker, pushing the vicissitudes of the “Russian U-turn” into the background. Both delimitations can be complementary. And with the involvement of the CSTO / SCO / BRICS lead to the constitution of an economic and political counterbalance to the West. At the same time, the logic embedded in this variant of bipolarity is balanced by quite powerful economic and political imperatives. For key SCO / BRICS countries (Russia, China, India), economic cooperation with the West and receiving investments and the latest technologies from it are highly significant. It is not obvious that they will be ready to oppose this factor to the line on the priority maintenance of relations with each other. There are also contradictions within the mentioned structures (China — India, India — Pakistan, between the countries of Central Asia) - sometimes more acute than between the member states and the West. So with all the attractiveness of the idea of forming an alternative international system of politically motivated desire to challenge the “old establishment”, this may not be enough.

Finally, let us mention one more theoretically possible variant of a system-level fault, which could have developed on the basis of counteraction to Islamic radicalism. Probably, this line, if we start from some speculative assumptions, would even be able to bring Russia, the West and China together. But such a too far-reaching hypothesis clearly does not find confirmation in practice. Although fears about the threat posed by radical (extremist) Islamism are widespread, its opponents remain very far from becoming real allies - neither in a trilateral, nor even in a bilateral configuration.

(iii) For the level of the international system, another category of challenges is significant, which determines either its “deepening” in internal affairs or its “elevation” over the prevailing national-state imperatives of foreign policy. We outline three groups of problems here. Let's start with the question of how internal issues and international relations should relate to each other. And again, recall: discussions on this subject - both conceptual and at the level of practical politics - are by no means related to something new. At the same time, it must be admitted that today this subject itself is acquiring a very sharp articulation. Particularly serious are the collisions around sovereignty and the “color revolutions”.

At one extreme, there is a minimalist and even prohibitive approach to external interference in the internal affairs of states, since it can be an expression of the aggressive efforts of some participants in international life, their desire for dominance. On the other is the thesis about the growing influence of processes that are transnational in nature, about the deepest (and growing) connection of problem situations within the country with the outside world and about the fundamental impossibility of isolating oneself from it with a blank wall.

Polemic battles can be fought on this basis - sometimes useful and sometimes not very fruitful (as if today they discussed with pathos why it is impossible to create a perpetual motion machine and how to create it all the same). But real (and often bloody) conflicts may arise. There is no need to establish a new world order in order to determine the ways to stop such conflicts. The direction in which a solution is possible has long been indicated - this is the adoption by the state of some obligations regarding the conformity of its internal development with certain criteria. Both the criteria and the obligations to comply with them can be formal, but it is much more important that they constitute a kind of "code of conduct" recognized *de facto*.

Perhaps, over time, this will become an increasingly common practice - as part of the development of an international system using a liberal algorithm. However, now in some of its segments the movement along this path has clearly stalled (or even gone in the opposite direction). And judging by many signs, this dynamics will determine the nature of the development of the international system for a long time. But even with the next change of vector, evolution in this direction will be very slow. But the likelihood of additional conflict on this basis is much higher. Modern life is replete with relevant examples - when, for example, external counterparties of a country affected by unrest interpret the events taking place in it from exactly opposite positions (as in the case of Ukraine and Syria) or when it is not possible to agree on measures that the international can and should take community (as is the case with Libya).

Thus, in modern conditions, "deepening" in the internal problems from the level of the international political system can have a conflictogenic character. And here comes the second question: can we assume that its "elevation" to the level of common challenges and global problems becomes an effective antithesis? Here, the emerging picture seems very ambiguous. On the one hand, the presence of common problems has traditionally been considered and is considered an incentive for the consolidation of the international community, since the imperativeness of cooperative interaction in such areas where it is impossible to achieve significant results acting separately is obvious. And in practice, the field of international cooperation is expanding here. The list of keywords that indicate the areas of its development is constantly growing: ecology, climate, human health, migration, new technologies - but also terrorism, corruption, other forms of transnational criminal activity...

Optimists are convinced that the incentives for cooperation are so powerful that they will soon even make it possible to overcome the collapse of relations between Russia and the West, or at least somehow mix it. But skeptics have reason for pessimistic assessments and forecasts. Global problems and common challenges for all not only push states towards cooperation, but also create new contradictions between them. For example, they can exacerbate actual inequalities in technological capabilities (since leaders will always strive to tailor joint solutions to their interests and are by no means altruistic to share achievements with lagging ones). Or, different countries may have different relationships with their other priorities (as is now happening in the field of cybersecurity). And the already considerable experience in addressing such problems, although certainly positive, still does not indicate a qualitative breakthrough in the sense of impact on the international system. For example, the issue of combating international terrorism - contrary to expectations - has not become a powerful driver for joint action.

We define this as a phenomenon of sovereign particularism. We are talking about representations and political imperatives proceeding from the absolute value of sovereignty and the equally absolute prevalence of national (country) interests.

Today, this type of thinking and such a line in practical terms seems legitimate and natural to many. And how else to interpret the tasks of foreign policy, the goals of economic development, the conditions for ensuring security - if not through the unconditional priority of their own interests? There are many countries in which this roll is found. Its preservation and especially strengthening can affect the mentality in relation to the outside world. Putting particular motives in the first place and pushing into the background those that go beyond the framework of national-state pragmatism, are related to the problems of society in the broad sense of the word or have a solidarity character.

The arguments from the arsenal of "national egoism" can be quite successfully appealed in the propaganda struggle, since they do not require complex substantiation and are relatively easily supported within the country. Hence the attractive opportunities for the effective legitimization of relevant policies.

Moreover, it is easy to justify it by appealing to sovereignty (“we do what we consider necessary, guided by national interests and resisting any external pressure”). The implications for the international system are obvious. As a result, there will be more and more prerequisites for international conflict, the search for mutually acceptable compromises will become more difficult, and the system itself will undergo dangerous stability tests.

#### **TRADITIONAL ISSUES: VARIABLE ACCENTS**

In the framework of today's and tomorrow's world order, all those issues that had to be addressed yesterday and the day before remained on the agenda. But it is worth paying attention to some new accents that have already appeared in the political discourse and, most likely, should be the object of increased attention. It is possible that it is here that some fundamental parameters that correct the world order may come to light.

(i) A notable novelty is a wider interpretation of security and everything related to it across the entire spectrum of problems arising here - regarding threats and challenges to security, conditions for its provision, methods used, tools and instruments, parameters of possible interaction with external contractors, etc. Security is a more diverse and multidimensional phenomenon than a purely military phenomenon; they now rank the situation in many areas of public life that previously were outside the scope of this topic.

This is a very controversial trend. On the one hand, it more adequately reflects the realities of life, and on the other, it erodes the specifics of the very concept of “security,” since any problem can be attributed to it. Security criteria are devalued, the possibility of its adequate assessment, which can take on a market character, based on situationally triggered alarmism.

Such an approach, it would seem, should be the antithesis of traditional military force thinking - but in reality they often go hand in hand. On this basis, old algorithms also come back to life - such as the one that describes the classic paradox of security, when, in taking care of it as applied to oneself, they actually create incentives for activating the opponent's military-force preparations. The result may be the phenomenon of self-justifying prophecy, which is observed, in particular, in the context of the renewed confrontation between Russia and NATO. It is dangerous if it becomes the norm.

(ii) Of great concern is the critical situation in the field of nuclear weapons [2]. All those concerns that seemed to be overcome over the past few decades are being revived over the full spectrum. There is a threat that all the accumulated experience of relevant discussions by politicians, experts and official negotiators will be crossed out, when official agreements were prepared and concluded, intensive activity was carried out to verify them. There is a public legitimization of both the political use of nuclear weapons and their military use - which for decades has been, if not tabooed, then politically incorrect topic. For international relations, there are extremely serious consequences. Firstly, through the emergence on this basis of imperatives for military construction and the promotion of new cycles of the arms race. Secondly, through the threat of dangerous balancing on the brink of war in an area fraught with a rapid escalation of military conflict with disastrous consequences. Thirdly, in connection with the high probability of the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the prospect of its acquisition by new states, as well as the growing danger of nuclear terrorism.

The challenge that arises in this connection to the international political system is truly dramatic. Either stop these changes (which may turn out to be unrealizable) - or focus on the revival of nuclear arms control in the future (preferably not too distant; perhaps from zero level, with a different configuration of participants and based on adjusted guidelines and principles). The encouraging circumstance is that the participants in international life have already passed this way. A new world order can be formed without arms control. However, in this case, its effectiveness (at least in the field of ensuring international security) will be extremely problematic.

(iii) A very clearly traceable trend in modern international development is the weakening of self-restraints (formal and political) regarding the cross-border use of force. Here, however, one does not need to exaggerate either - there is hardly any reason to believe that the “right of the strong” is becoming the undoubtedly prevailing algorithm and that almost everyone is always and everywhere ready to use force to achieve their goals in the international arena. The role of a sufficiently significant regulator in this regard is still played by international law (although not always and often with virtuoso flexibility in its interpretation). There are other constraints, for example, material or due to fear of undesirable reputation consequences. Nevertheless, examples of forceful interference in external situations continue to multiply. There were a lot of them in the past, but today there is a danger of a kind of “banalization” of the cross-border use of force, when it will be not so much something extraordinary (or, at least, disrupting the normal course of events), as now, as a routine practice, which everyone is used to and accept it if not

for granted, then as inevitable. Even Moscow, during the turbulent perturbations of the last decade, to some extent deviated from the most restrictive approach to this matter, which it traditionally adhered to in its declarative policy (no use of force outside except for self-defense, at the invitation of official authorities or with the sanction of the Security Council UN). The alarmist interpretation of the trend towards a more active cross-border use of force suggests that this may become even broader in territorial distribution. At the same time, discussions about its legitimacy will recede into the background - the problem will most likely be seen in obtaining the maximum result, achieving this as soon as possible and ensuring minimizing political costs (both internal and external).

What are the consequences of such a development? The actions of any country in this vein may result in a more “lightweight” adoption of appropriate decisions in the future. It should be noted that the leadership here is by no means with Russia, but if, in connection with Kosovo and Iraq, it counteracted this process, then with the involvement in Syria it ended up in the mainstream. Another consequence is that international legal instruments in situations of cross-border use of force are being knocked out more often and devalued, giving way to political propaganda. One can trace the connection with the reassessment of ideas about the relative decrease in the role of military force, which were popular in the context of overcoming the Cold War.

Finally, the distinction between the “force” and “non-force” effects of a transboundary nature is becoming increasingly blurred. The concept of “hybrid war” that arose in this connection focuses both fears regarding external threats and the potential impact on others. Both this and the other are becoming a complex phenomenon that can include everything from straightforward and “black” propaganda to bribing politicians, from cyberattacks to actions to destabilize the financial system, from organizing separatist movements to special forces rallies, etc. Strictly speaking, here we are by no means confronted with something fundamentally new. Numerous examples of this are well known from history (and even from biblical texts) - “hybrid wars” were encountered quite often, although there was no such thing.

But some circumstances associated with this phenomenon can probably be considered new. They appeared in the last 10-15 years. First, the use of appropriate “technologies” was tested on an unprecedentedly wide scale (which opens the door to the future for them). Secondly, the colossal possibilities of propaganda and political manipulations in this area were revealed, which turned out to be an order of magnitude higher than could be expected. Thirdly, a striking phenomenon of the apology of “hybrid wars” has arisen - when they begin to be considered more productive (or more dangerous - depending on the angle of view) in comparison with traditional methods.

(iv) Another world-old problem that looms on the palette of the existing (or emerging) world order concerns the country status of territories. This includes topics such as changing borders, secession, irredentism, etc. They were never simple, but they can gain new (and dangerous) dynamics under the influence of quick and profound changes, which are replacing centuries-old immobilism. Especially where there is a surge of socio-political activity, including the search for identity by ethnic, religious, cultural-historical, state-country and other markers. Contradictions regarding the borders and country affiliation of territories have always been one of the main sources of conflict and war. For most of human history, these problems have been resolved in this way. But gradually, the international community has accumulated some experience with regard to attempts to non-violent resolution of such conflicts.

This experience indicates the exceptional complexity of such a task. But he also generates the understanding that you can't act in a hurry and in a hurry (or then you will have to seriously pay for it). There is a huge history of the matter; a wide variety of approaches have been developed (including at a very high professional level through the OSCE). The demand for this potential is objectively important to minimize the conflict algorithm in solving these problems. Russia resolved the issue with Crimea quickly and at first glance extremely efficiently. The fact that she will not “back up” in relation to this situation is obvious. As well as the fact that there are hardly anyone who wants to test Russia for strength in the Crimean issue. So if the international legal side of the matter, apparently, will remain unresolved for a long time, then its geopolitical component looks quite stable.

But at the same time, it is far from obvious what conclusions could be drawn from the indicated precedent as applied to the international system. Does this open the way to the implementation of the same scenario in other places and by other actors? Is it always necessary (and possible) to proceed from the unconditional prevalence of the principle of self-determination (popular expression of will) over any other imperatives? What political agreements and arrangements can be respected or ignored? How important is the factor of external guarantees or its absence? How promising is “land gathering” based on the principles of ethnic community or political self-identification of the population? How large is the role of the temporal pressuredness of changes (the “quick power” factor)? How reasonable (appropriate) is the

direct use of force or its projection using “hybrid technologies”? Such factors that determine the behavior of states in such crisis situations are specific and situational. But they may be relevant in areas of international turbulence (for example, in Africa, the Middle East) - even despite the convincingly demonstrated very high political, reputational and other costs of unilateral actions containing a significant power component.

### CONCLUSION

The debate about whether the existing world order is good or bad and whether its alternative options are possible, in our turbulent, time full of changes, is probably inevitable. In them, it seems, it is important to have three key characteristics of the world order in the focus of analytical attention: its stability, efficiency, and maturity. The key to stability of any world order is its successful functioning. The most important indicator of effectiveness is the ability to adequately respond to the challenges that arise in the process of international political development. And a sign of maturity is the ability of participants to minimize those problems that cannot be resolved, to keep themselves from panic on this basis and to aim for constructive interaction to maintain international stability.

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## ПРАВА ЧЕЛОВЕКА ДОЛЖНА БЫТЬ БАЗОВОЙ ОСНОВОЙ ПРАВОВОЙ ПОЛИТИКИ КАЗАХСТАНА

### Аннотация

Настоящая статья посвящена анализу проблемы осуществления правовой политики в государстве. Автор анализирует происхождение и взаимодействие политических и правовых норм. В статье также ставится вопрос о политическом сознании и правосознании. Наиболее значимому анализу в настоящей статье подвергается проблема взаимосвязи и взаимодействия государственной политики с правом.

Автор приходит к выводу о необходимости проведения правовой политики как политики справедливости и заступничества, политики, основанной исключительно на праве. Проанализированы основные направления правовой политики. Определены проблемные аспекты формирования правовой политики. В частности, затронуты вопросы применения статей уголовного кодекса о возбуждении социальной, национальной, родовой, расовой, сословной или религиозной розни, о клевете, а также вопросов проведения митингов и демонстраций.

Предложены ряд рекомендации по совершенствованию правовой политики. Выделены основные механизмы реализации правовой политики на современном этапе. Обозначены первостепенные задачи по реализации правовой политики.

**Ключевые слова:** политические нормы, правовые нормы, политическое сознание, правосознание, государственная политика, правовая политика, уголовный кодекс

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