

Роберт Дейли, директор Института Киссинджера по Китаю и США в Центре Уилсона в Вашингтоне, округ Колумбия, также упомянул тот факт, что «в последние годы не было фильмов, в которых бы изображали Коммунистическую партию Китая или материков Китая с критической точки зрения, вместо этого Китай спас мир в «2012 году» и «*Martian* (Марсианин)».

Предоставление контроля над голливудскими блокбастерами китайским цензорам является переломным моментом в отношениях Голливуда с Китаем. Она приводит к выводу, что, если китайский рынок продолжит расти, новые производства будут все больше направляться в Китай [8]. Этот контроль контента со стороны Китая направлен как на то, чтобы избежать негативных представлений о Китае за рубежом, так и на контроле того, что отображается внутри Китая. Это связано с двойной функцией китайской культурной дипломатии, которая рассматривается как фундаментальная стратегия компенсации культурной гегемонии западных стран и противодействия культурной модернизации и вестернизации в Китае при сохранении безопасности и культурного единства [9].

Использование культурной дипломатии в качестве инструмента международного внедрения соответствует возросшей ценности, которую китайское правительство придает культуре в XXI веке. Это привело к росту инвестиций в инструменты китайской культурной дипломатии (СМИ, киноиндустрии). Правительство Китая признало необходимость улучшить имидж Китая, чтобы усилить его присутствие во всем мире. Культурная дипломатия рассматривалась как инструмент для снятия напряженности и создания благоприятных условий.

Китай – это крупнейший кинорынок. Может пройти еще несколько лет, прежде чем экономика Китая обгонит Америку, но это уже самый большой кинорынок по состоянию на первый квартал 2018 года. Кроме того, у него есть средства для финансирования кинопроизводства за пределами Китая. Эти факты будут иметь все большее значение для развивающихся кинорынков. Китай медленно, но верно становится заметным игроком за пределами финансовой сферы. Что еще предстоит выяснить, так это то, может ли его участие в кино и медиа пространстве мотивировать более глубокое взаимодействие между китайским и другими обществами.

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**KAZAKHSTAN'S GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS AS PART OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE**

*Abstract.* The BRI by China is gaining momentum and is potentially capable of connecting Europe and Asia. Along with that, the Initiative is modifying the economies of the participating countries.

The PRC Initiative is quite attractive and productive for Kazakhstan, as it can contribute to the accelerated transformation of the country and its inclusion in the transport, logistics and production chains of the world.

Unlike other countries of the BRI, Kazakhstan is strategically positioned as the portal of China to Europe - from the common border in Khorgos to the western coast of the Caspian Sea in Aktau.

The multivariate behavior of PRC at a new stage of its development increases the risks for Kazakhstan. It does not allow accurately calculating the threat vectors and the degree of risk, therefore, the possibilities of minimizing them are associated with the creation of fundamental balances in case China develops or behaves according to options unfavorable for Kazakhstan.

**Key words:** China, Silk road economic belt, Chinese investment, transit, Chinese projects, risks.

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## «БЕЛДЕУ ЖӘНЕ ЖОЛ» БАСТАМАСЫ АЯСЫНДАҒЫ ҚАЗАҚСТАННЫҢ ГЕОСАЯСИ МҮДДЕЛЕРІ

### *Аңдатпа*

Қытайдың «Белдеу және жол» бастамасы қарқын алуда және шын мәнінде Еуропа мен Азияны байланыстыра алады. Сонымен бірге, аталмыш бастама қатысушы елдердің экономикаларын өзгертуде.

ҚХР бастамасы Қазақстан үшін өте тартымды және нәтижелі, өйткені ол елдің тез өзгеруіне және оны әлемнің көліктік, логистикалық және өндірістік тізбегіне қосуға ықпал ете алады.

Басқа елдермен салыстырғанда, бастама аясында Қазақстан Қытайдан Еуропаға дейін - Қорғастағы ортақ шекарадан бастап Ақтаудағы Каспий теңізінің батыс жағалауына дейін стратегиялық орын алады.

ҚХР дамуының жаңа кезеңіндегі көп бағытты әрекеті Қазақстан үшін тәуекелдерді арттыруда. Бұл қауіп бағыттарын және тәуекел дәрежесін дәл есептеуге мүмкіндік бермейді, сондықтан Қытай Қазақстан үшін қолайсыз нұсқалар бойынша дамып немесе әрекет еткен жағдайда оларды азайту мүмкіндіктері іргелі теңгерімдер құрумен байланысты.

**Кілт сөздер:** Қытай, Жібек жолы экономикалық белдеуі, қытай инвестициялары, транзит, қытайлық жобалар, қауіптер.

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## ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ИНТЕРЕСЫ КАЗАХСТАНА В РАМКАХ ИНИЦИАТИВЫ «ПОЯС И ПУТЬ»

### *Аннотация*

Китайская инициатива «Пояс и путь» набирает обороты и потенциально способна соединить Европу и Азию. Наряду с этим инициатива меняет экономику стран-участниц. Инициатива КНР является достаточно привлекательной и продуктивной для Казахстана, поскольку она может способствовать ускоренной трансформации страны и ее включению в транспортные, логистические и производственные цепочки мира.

В отличие от других стран в рамках инициативы «Пояс и путь» Казахстан стратегически позиционируется как портал Китая в Европу - от общей границы в Хоргосе до западного побережья Каспийского моря в Актау.

Многофакторное поведение Китая на новом этапе ее развития увеличивает риски для Казахстана. Это не позволяет точно рассчитать векторы угроз и степень риска, поэтому возможности их минимизации связаны с созданием фундаментальных балансов в случае развития или поведения Китая в соответствии с неблагоприятными для Казахстана вариантами.

**Ключевые слова:** Китай, Экономический пояс шелкового пути, китайские инвестиции, транзит, китайские проекты, риски.

## INTRODUCTION

China's Belt and Road initiative is gaining momentum and is potentially capable of connecting Europe and Asia. It will transform along the way the economies of the countries participating in the Chinese initiative.

The PRC initiative is very attractive and productive for Kazakhstan, as it can contribute to the accelerated transformation of the country and its inclusion in the transport, logistics and production chains of the world.

### ***Current analysis of the state of Kazakh-Chinese relations***

In November 2014, the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev, in his Address to the People of Kazakhstan "Nurly Zhol - the Way to the Future" formulated a program. This program was devoted to the maximum possible increase of Eurasian transit through Kazakhstan. The Presidential Decree approved the corresponding State Infrastructure Development Program "Nurly Zhol" for 2015-2019.

**Firstly. In the fall of 2016, Kazakhstan and China signed a Cooperation Plan for pairing Nurly Zhol and the Silk Road Economic Belt.** As a result, a list of 51 joint projects in Kazakhstan was formed. During the implementation of the cooperation plan, the list of joint projects was expanded to 55 enterprises with a total investment of \$ 27 billion. Up to 2019, 14 projects were commissioned for \$ 3.9 billion. 11 projects for \$ 5.5 billion are under implementation; preparatory work is ongoing on the remaining projects worth \$ 18.1 billion [1].

Most of the projects are implemented in the field of renewable energy (renewable energy sources) of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, mining and metallurgical complex, mechanical engineering, oil and gas sector and in the energy sector. All products are guaranteed to have a sales market - China. It is expected that the implementation of the projects will create about 20 thousand new job places: all initiatives plan to use local labor by 99%.

**Secondly. Unlike other countries of the BRI, Kazakhstan is strategically positioned as the portal of China to Europe - from the common border in Khorgos to the western coast of the Caspian Sea in Aktau.** So Kazakhstan is directly involved in three directions of the Eurasian transcontinental:

China - Kazakhstan - Russia - Europe, with access to the Baltic Sea;

China - Kazakhstan - Azerbaijan - Georgia - Turkey - Europe, as part of the international TRACECA program, with access to the Black and Mediterranean Seas;

China - Kazakhstan - Turkmenistan - Iran - Pakistan, with access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

It is supposed to move in these directions along six routes, and Kazakhstan is participating in five of them.

**Thirdly. China is one of the four main trading countries for Kazakhstan.** By July 2019, the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and China exceeded \$ 8 billion. It was the first time in the last five years. In general, trade with China has decreased twicely. Therefore, in 2012 and 2013, commodity circulation exceeded \$ 20 billion [2].

After a 3-year decline in trade between 2014 and 2016, when trade was reduced by several times to less than 10 billion US dollars, stable growth was observed.

**Fourthly. Over 6 years (2013-2019), a number of major infrastructure projects were commissioned in Kazakhstan:** the Lianyungang port, the dry port of Khorgos on the border with China, the port of Aktau and Kuryk on the Caspian Sea, the new railway corridor Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran (total length - about 900 km), connecting the countries of Central Asia with the Persian Gulf and the port of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran; international transit corridor "Western Europe - Western China", part of which passes through the territory of Kazakhstan.

### **Prospects of development**

***Firstly, the central position in the China-EU route makes Kazakhstan an ideal place to create a transport services market (rolling stock rental, logistics solutions and cargo transportation).*** Transit operations generate the most revenue per tonne per kilometer, so transit is expected to become a significant source of revenue for Kazakhstan. Moreover, if rail services are streamlined and rules are reduced, a dynamic and profitable internal logistics industry will emerge. By 2020, the indicator of container traffic is planned to be brought up to 2 million US dollars (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Asia-EU-Asia transit container traffic via Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan has got significant investments to strengthen its position as a transit corridor. So, according to Samruk-Kazyna, investments in infrastructure will annually contribute to the economic development of Kazakhstan at the level of **0.1% -0.2%** over the next decade.

**Secondly, it will be possible to create a new large trading ecosystem of production sectors.** Thus, an improved logistics ecosystem will allow Kazakhstani producers of food products, machinery, leather products and any other developing industry to quickly enter foreign markets. China's active trade balance in the EU means that many trains will return from the EU with empty containers. Unused carrying capacity can be purchased at a cost lower than standard, which will allow Kazakhstani producers to export cheaper than ever before (Figure 2).

**Freight transport demand is increasing worldwide**

**Growth for freight transport demand (2010=100)**




Figure 2. Freight transport demand.

Thus, the BRI provides Kazakhstan with the opportunity to once again become a key region linking global trade. This is the biggest growth opportunity Kazakhstan since gaining independence. The largest stakeholders in the country are national companies that need to ensure their willingness to support the huge volumes of transit through the country over the coming years.

As the ninth largest state in the world and the largest landlocked country, Kazakhstan can get significant opportunities as the geographical center of the land part of the New Silk Road. Currently, **90%** of trade between China and Europe is carried out by ship, and less than **5%** - by rail. Further investment of political and financial capital can increase rail trade by **10%** by 2025 [3]. Countless opportunities arise for national trade and industry, as local businesses can benefit from lower export and import costs, as well as providing services to freight forwarders and rail carriers.

**Scenario and Predictions**

Many analysts, both Chinese and Kazakhstani, are closely monitoring the development of the initiative and are trying to predict how its implementation will affect the situation in the countries involved, in particular in Kazakhstan. Many of them indicate external political risks that may affect the implementation of the project.

**In the medium term,** within the framework of the BRI, the creation of the “21st Century Marine Silk Road” is contrary to the interests of the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region, primarily Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and will meet with resistance from their side.

Therefore, for Beijing, in the short and medium term, the priority will be the implementation of the land "Silk Road Economic Belt", which starts through the territory of the SCO member states friendly to China and, first of all, Kazakhstan and Russia.

**In the long run**, the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative will remain an economic project aimed at developing the interior of China. When implemented, with certain exceptions, a network of bilateral agreements and free trade zones will be created. However, a full-fledged integration association in the vastness of Eurasia (by analogy with the EAEU or the EU) will not be created.

But **even in the format of a limited temporary implementation**, the "One Belt - One Way" initiative will lead to the following significant changes:

**According to the optimistic scenario:**

**(1) market expansion for Chinese products.** Creating additional demand for Chinese products in Central and Eastern Europe, Central and South Asia will reduce the criticality of the problem of overcapacity in China;

**(2) changing the structure and direction of Chinese exports.** The share of the United States and the EU in total exports from China will decrease (while maintaining the leading position) in favor of the countries of Central Asia, the EAEU, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus;

**(3) changing the corporate business card of the regions.** Following direct Chinese investment in the countries of Central Asia, the EAEU, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Chinese multinationals, as well as small and medium businesses will come. Companies will follow the project leader (construction of infrastructure facilities), providing consulting, trade, technological, engineering, software and other support;

**(4) reduction of internal migration.** The development of domestic provinces (especially XUAR) will lead to a decrease in the number of labor migrants in China and an increase in consumer demand;

**(5) an increase in the Chinese yuan share** in world trade and the financial system;

**(6) increasing the efficiency of large companies and the PRC business as a whole.** An invitation to participate in projects, for example, of foreign companies and investors from the highly developed countries of Europe and Asia contributes to obtaining unique experience in international conditions and according to the rules of global reporting;

**(7) the interpenetration of the national economies of the countries participating in the project** contributes to the convergence of technical regulation norms (harmonization of standards) of individual countries and, of course, will affect the development and dynamics of trade relations, a significant reduction in administrative and technical barriers between countries.

**According to the pessimistic scenario:**

**(1)** the use of Chinese capital involves the purchase of Chinese equipment and engineering services, which will lead to increased dependence of national economies on the PRC and stagnation of national industrial production in the participating country of the project;

**(2)** China protectionist policies will lead to the dominance of Chinese business to the detriment of national business. This will cause protests of national governments and businessmen with the disruption of projects launched, the growth of anti-Chinese protests, a blow to the interests of third participating countries;

**(3)** China desire for strict supranational regulation will lead to a loss of support from the participating countries until the boycott of the project;

**(4)** China inattention to standards will lead to an increase in anti-Chinese mood in society, contributing to the likelihood of a military conflict;

**(5)** the destabilization of the domestic or regional situation (including the situation in China itself due to the existence of separatist regions - XUAR and Tibet) creates security risks of the disruption of the projects launched, the growth of anti-Chinese actions, and a blow to the interests of China and third countries.

**Challenges and risks for Kazakhstan:**

The possibilities of China and Kazakhstan are not commensurate. Kazakhstan is the 9th country in the world by territory, but the size of its population and gross domestic product completely overshadows neighboring China. The population of Kazakhstan is smaller than the population in the city of Beijing (21.50 million people, 2016), and the economy of Kazakhstan is less than 1/45 of the Chinese economy (as of 2016).

At the same time, Kazakhstan is of great importance for China: Kazakhstan is a key transport belt for overland delivery of Chinese products to European markets.

Kazakhstan runs the risk of being drawn into the orbit of China's economic, and then, naturally, political influence. The dilemma that has now arisen in front of Kazakhstan is seen as being solved only with the participation of third world leaders (USA, EU, India, etc.), whose influence helps maintain a balance of power in the Central Asian region. In these conditions, **the preservation and further development of a multi-vector foreign policy is of particular relevance to the Republic of Kazakhstan.**

The status of regional players in Central Asia is changing. China is the most active player in the Central Asian region, acting as the economic driver of the region. Russia does not have enough economic resources to withstand the growing influence of China in the Central Asian region. Modern Russia, in its present state - under the pressure of Western sanctions and with a GDP that is much inferior to China's GDP [4] - is not able to offer an economic solution for Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia.

To minimize economic and political risks, it seems appropriate to carry out the event in line with the following **recommendations**:

- within the framework of international organizations, **the creation of a single group in the EAEU to coordinate and synchronize** Chinese and national regional **development programs**, as well as development programs of other countries;

- within the framework of the national economy, **the creation of joint ventures** for the implementation of regional projects; localization of production using the potential of national enterprises (strengthening the Kazakhstan component); inclusion of national enterprises in the production chains of multinational companies;

- within the framework of interstate cooperation, involve **neighboring countries** - Russia, Central Asian countries, Iran, etc., in participation in certain projects of the BRI.

The multivariate behavior of China at a new stage of its development increases the risks for Kazakhstan. It does not allow calculating accurately the threat vectors and the degree of risk, therefore, the possibilities of minimizing them are associated with the creation of fundamental balance sheets in case China develops or acts according to options unfavorable for Kazakhstan. These mechanisms to minimize threats and risks are:

(1) the formation of legal, financial and institutional infrastructure to ensure national interests when connecting to Chinese projects;

(2) the creation of strategic balancers in the event of overdependence on Beijing or an internal crisis in China. In the military-political aspect - due to cooperation with world actors - the Russian Federation and the USA, in the economic - with the EU, RF, USA, Japan, India, South Korea and other countries of the world.

**Conclusion.** China is increasing its economic presence in Kazakhstan, and it is very likely that China will soon play a significant role in the economy of Kazakhstan, and the following factors indicate this:

**1.** Kazakhstan has become for China the main trading partner in Central Asia.

**2.** Kazakhstan has become for China the largest investment target in the Eurasian region.

**3.** China sees Kazakhstan, first of all, as a transit country on the road to building the ambitious New Silk Road from Asia to Europe.

**Three main factors determine the current policy of China in relation to Kazakhstan:**

**firstly**, *maintaining regional stability* (creating a security belt around the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and developing the XUAR itself);

**secondly**, *access to the raw materials of Kazakhstan* (oil, gas and uranium);

**thirdly**, *ensuring reliable transit* of Turkmen gas to China through the territory of Kazakhstan.

All this creates certain risks for Kazakhstan.

**1. Almost all Chinese projects implemented in Kazakhstan are aimed at exporting products outside the republic.** It is possible that in the medium term (10-20 years) most of the promising enterprises of the Republic of Kazakhstan will be under the leadership of Chinese businessmen or in joint participation with entrepreneurs from China. At the same time, the growth and expansion of Chinese capital and China's economic participation is gradually inevitably transforming **into political leverage**.

**2. China is not interested in the industrial development of Kazakhstan.** China prefers to invest in the mining industry of Kazakhstan, which is less risky and more profitable than manufacturing. China increasingly sees Kazakhstan as a raw materials appendage.

**3. Overly rapid development of XUAR may lead to water scarcity and pollution in Kazakhstan.**

According to the assessment of the Kazgiprovodkhoz design/project institute, there is already a danger of losing Lake Balkhash due to the large withdrawal of water by the Chinese side. Earlier,

agreements were reached with the Chinese side on the withdrawal of water from the Irtysh in the amount of not more than **2 cubic kilometers per year**. At present, the Chinese side's water withdrawal from the Black Irtysh has actually reached volumes of more than **3 cubic kilometers per year**, since the infrastructure facilities built in the XUAR require water in the amount of **at least 5 cubic kilometers per year** (the irrigated area in the XUAR is 4.6 million hectares. For comparison - in Kazakhstan 1.3 million hectares).

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**БАЛАЛАР ҮЙІНДЕ ТӘРБИЕ АЛУШЫЛАРДЫҢ ДЕВИАНТТЫ МІНЕЗ-ҚҰЛҚЫ:  
ЖҮЙЕЛІК ӘДЕБИ ТАЛДАУ**

*Аңдатпа*

Мақалада балалар үйінде тәрбие алушылардың девиантты мінез-құлқына психологиялық, социологиялық және философиялық көзқарас тарапынан салыстырмалы талдау және жүйелік әдеби шолу көрсетілген. Жүйелік әдеби шолу американдық, еуропалық, британдық, азиялық авторлардың балалар үйінде тәрбиеленушілердің девиантты мінез-құлқы мен отбасы құрылымының байланысы бойынша зерттеулерге негізделеді.

Бұл мақалада негізгі назар балалардың девиантты мінез-құлқының феноменіне және бұған жаһандық контекстегі отбасылық комбинациялар қалай әсер ететініне аударылды. Мақалада дәстүрлі отбасында, баласы бар алайда ажырасқан отбасыларда, баланың тек әкесімен немесе анасымен қалған отбасыларда, бала асырап алған отбасыларда, балалар үйінде тұратын немесе ата-анасынан ажыратылған отбасылардағы тәрбиеленуші балалардың девиантты мінез-құлқына талдау берілген. Бұл талдау мақалада көптеген шетелдік зерттеулердің қорытындылары негізінде жүйелік әдеби шолуға негізделген. Бұл зерттеулерді әдеби шолу арқылы балалар үйінде тәрбиеленушілердің девиантты мінез-құлқы көрсетуінің себеп-салдарларын анықтауға көмектеседі.

Бірнеше онжылдықтар бойы отандық және шетелдік отбасы мен бала арасындағы қарым-қатынастың түрлі аспектілері бойынша көптеген ғылыми зерттеулер жарияланды. Мұнда зерттелетін мәселеге тікелей және жанама қатысы бар ғылыми-зерттеу жұмыстарына егжей-тегжейлі шолу жасауға әрекет жасалды. Бұл зерттеулер түрлі кәсіби журналдардан, коммерциялық журналдардан және басқа да көздерден жиналған.

**Түйін сөздер:** девиантты мінез-құлқы, балалар үйі тәрбиеленушілері, деликвентті мінез.

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