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ARMIES AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

Abstract

A lot of political and social studies focused on the transformations that the Arab world experienced, especially the period that followed the Arab Spring revolutions since the beginning of 2011. These studies discussed the issue of the elites and their role in the events that took place and are still taking place in the Arab world since that date. Analysts have put on the table two important questions regarding the issue of the elite: What is the role of the elite, and did it really play a role in directing events? Or did these revolutions take place without leadership, and the elite could not catch up with these revolutions? As for the second question, it was about the role of the military elites, and their role in aborting the Arab Spring revolutions, changing their direction and stealing their fruit. In this study, I tried to shed light on the role of the military institution in obstructing democratic transition, as well as revealing the military elite's exploitation of other elites in order to achieve its goal. And how some political elites preferred to stand with the military in order to obtain personal benefits and thus missed the Arabs the biggest real opportunity for democratic transformation and the realization of some of the demands of the Arab revolutions. This position taken by the political elite that cooperated with the military in order to eliminate its political opponents is considered The biggest political betrayal committed by some political elites in the Arab world.

Keywords: Arab world, political elite, Arab Army, democratization, political conflicts

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АРАБ ӘЛЕМІНДЕГІ ӘСКЕРЛЕР МЕН ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦИЯ

Аңдатпа

Көптеген саяси және әлеуметтік зерттеулер араб әлемі бастан өткерген өзгерістерге, әсіресе 2011 жылдың басынан бері "Араб көктемі" төңкерістерінен кейінгі кезеңге бағытталған. Бұл зерттеулер элиталар мен олардың араб әлемінде болған және болып жатқан оқиғалардағы рөлі туралы мәселені талқылады. Сарапшылар элита мәселесіне қатысты екі маңызды сұрақты талқылады: элитаның рөлі қандай және ол іс-шараларды басқаруда шынымен рөл атқарды ма? Немесе бұл төңкерістер басшылықсыз болды ма, Ал элита бұл революцияларды қуып жете алмады ма? Екінші сұраққа келетін болсақ, ол әскери элиталардың рөлі мен олардың араб көктемі төңкерістерінің жолын кесудегі, олардың бағытын өзгертудегі және жемістерін ұрлаудағы рөлі туралы болды. Бұл зерттеуде мен Әскери институттың демократиялық ауысуға кедергі жасаудағы рөліне жарық түсіруге тырыстым, сонымен қатар әскери элитаның өз мақсатына жету үшін басқа элиталарды қанағанын анықтауға тырыстым. Кейбір саяси элиталар жеке басының пайдасын көру үшін әскерилердің жағына шығуды қалай таңдады және осылайша

арабтар үшін демократиялық қайта құрулар мен араб революцияларының кейбір талаптарын жүзеге асырудың ең үлкен нақты мүмкіндігін жіберіп алды. Саяси қарсыластарын жою мақсатында әскерлермен ынтымақтастықта болған саяси элитаның бұл ұстанымы араб әлеміндегі кейбір саяси элиталар жасаған ең үлкен саяси сатқындық болып саналады.

Түйін сөздер: араб әлемі, саяси элита, араб әскері, демократизация, саяси қақтығыстар

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АРМИИ И ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦИЯ В АРАБСКОМ МИРЕ

Аннотация

Многие политические и социальные исследования были сосредоточены на преобразованиях, которые пережил арабский мир, особенно в периоде, последовавшем за революциями "арабской весны" с начала 2011 года. В этих исследованиях обсуждался вопрос об элитах и их роли в событиях, которые произошли и продолжают происходить в арабском мире с тех пор. Аналитики поставили на обсуждение два важных вопроса, касающихся проблемы элиты: какова роль элиты в данных событиях и действительно ли она играла роль в руководстве этими событиями? Или эти революции происходили без её руководства, и элита не смогла организовать эти революции? Что касается второго вопроса, то он касался роли военных элит и их роли в пресечении революций арабской весны, изменении их направления и присвоении их результатов. В этом исследовании я попытался пролить свет на роль военного института в препятствовании демократическому переходу, а также выявить эксплуатацию военной элитой других элит для достижения своей цели. И о том, как некоторые политические элиты предпочли встать на сторону военных, чтобы получить личную выгоду, и таким образом упустили для арабов самую большую реальную возможность для демократических преобразований и реализации некоторых требований арабских революций. Эта позиция, занятая политической элитой, которая сотрудничала с военными с целью устранения своих политических противников, считается крупнейшим политическим предательством, совершенным некоторыми политическими элитами в арабском мире.

Ключевые слова: арабский мир, политическая элита, арабская армия, демократизация, политические конфликты

Introduction

Another attempt to assess the role played by the military elites in the political arena in the Arab world, as well as the end of the Arab Spring without achieving its goals. That led to a more profound disappointment in the hearts of the Arab masses, who still suffer from the economic and political consequences of the events the Arab world is going through today.

This study aims to understand the type of conflict, the relationship between the political and military elites, and the extent of the impact of these relations on the form of the existing political systems. Can we expect the reaction of the military institutions to the various political events, especially those that demand a change in the status quo, such as the Arab Spring revolutions?

Accusations are mounting against the military elites in the Arab world of turning against the democratic process and that they are not ready to accept the principle of a civil authority that controls sovereign decisions and limits the ability of the military institution to exercise its paternalistic role in the Weberian sense (Max Weber), and holds it responsible for obstructing democratic transition. Of course, there is some justice in these accusations, but this study assumes that the political elites actively enable the military to implement their plans—the legitimacy of their actions.

We are searching for the reasons that brought the process of political and economic reform, in the Arab countries, to a dead end. However, how can the forces controlling the political decision be

persuaded to continue in the same direction will only lead to more failure? Moreover, the elites, with all their tendencies, are required to take historical positions commensurate with the seriousness of the stage the Arab world is going through.

Research methodology

The methodological basis of this study is the principle of historicity, systematic and comparative analysis. To solve the tasks set, a systematic comparative approach and special scientific methods of political science, as well as its subdisciplinary approaches, are used together. In the course of the study, such basic scientific concepts as elitism, conflict, developed in political science, were guided. The works of foreign, CIS and Kazakhstan scientists, which occupy a special place in the field of political conflicts, were also used.

The results of the works of the considered scientists contributed to the disclosure of the theoretical and methodological essence of our research topic.

Methodologically, the proposed analysis is based on D.North's theory of social order [1], widely used in modern political science as a whole, but much less often used in the analysis of political processes in the Middle East. Rather , the exceptions can be considered a monograph on the Syrian conflict by A.Basko and Zh. Dorronsoro [2] or political economic analysis of Middle Eastern processes by M.Kamett [3]. In general, the predominance of concrete empirical material remains characteristic of Middle Eastern studies, the analysis only rarely reaches the level of theoretical comprehension.

Starting with the consideration of the problem of typologization of Arab political systems, we will then highlight the main drivers and trends of current changes and, focusing on two of them, we will see what effect they cause in each of the models.

The dialectical relationship between the army and political power in the Arab world:

Is it possible to completely exclude the military from political life? What is meant here is the army's aspiration to politics in the narrow sense of exercising power and seizing it. Furthermore, what we mean here by the military are the armed forces organized into corps, battalions, companies, or any other formations–trained to obey orders according to the hierarchy of the highest rank and then the lowest in the chain of command from the army commander to The last soldier, whose mission is to defend the state and may intervene in exceptional cases to maintain internal security.

Here is another observation, the recent coups in the Arab world were not a coup by a group of officers against the army's leadership or the ruling regime but rather a coup carried out by the military institution collectively against the political process.

This brings us back to the dialectic of the military and civilian relationship. Wright Mills distinguishes himself from his predecessors in his analysis of the elite, as he focuses more on economic and social factors and combines the idea of an elite with the concept of power. As a result, he is the first to formulate the concept of "power elite" to denote the close link between the elite and political, economic, and military power.

Professor Ahmed Zayed says in the book Social Elites:

The link between the concept of elite and power has crystallized in the formulation of Mills, who introduced the concept of the Power elite. It meant those who occupy positions of power and influence in the upper circles of the central systems of society, such as senior army commanders, senior capital men, and senior politicians. In this formulation, Mills adhered to the concept of the elite. However, he did not return it to psychological foundations. Instead, he tried to discover the sources that give some individuals power and prevent others from political, economic, and military influence. Mills has made it clear how the interests of the constituent groups of the elite overlap and how their relations are intertwined so that it is difficult to separate the roles that members of any of its groups can play. Instead, they form a complex of relationships and interests. This formulation expanded the foundations on which the ruling could be based and then expanded the foundations for defining the elite. However, it maintained a "very narrow" framework for the elite. The power elite is still an oligarchy or a small number of individuals monopolizing power for itself and preventing it from others [4].

Perhaps one of the major problems addressed by the literature on civil-military relations and military sociology is the guarantees of achieving civilian control over the military. And the political

exercise of the role of hegemony and control over military affairs. According to one of the scholars, the major dilemma facing the literature is how to reconcile the presence of a military institution strong enough to fulfill the demands of civilians and the existence of a military loyalty sufficient not to exceed the authority delegated to them by civilians. That is, the balance here is between considerations of professionalism and professionalism, and upholding the values of impartiality and non-partisanship

And as the study of Dr. Ahmed Abd Rabbo showed in the first chapter of this book, studies of civil-military relations in general attach great importance to considering two things:

The first is the degree of independence of the military institution from the civilian authority and the extent of its impact on the principle of civilian control over the military. The second issue is the tendency of the military to interfere in political life, the coup style. Perhaps the pivotal study presented by (1) Samuel Huntington entitled "The Soldier and the State" is an important example of the dominance of the Western liberal model over the studies of military sociology). Huntington believes that civil-military relations are shaped by three basic variables: the functional determinant (external threat: high or low level), the ideological (whether the whole society is liberal or conservative) and the constitutional structure (whether the civilian elite is unified as in the case of the parliamentary system where rule the majority or was divided, as is the case when the executive and legislative branches share oversight functions) [5].

The separation between the political and military elites in some countries of the Arab world may seem straightforward. Unfortunately, however, it disappeared in others, especially those countries where the army played a vital role in building the state or liberating it from colonialism. In both cases, we can talk about a central elite consisting of political, military, and economic leaders. The dominance of one group over the other increases depending on the circumstances the country is going through. In the case of the Arab Spring revolutions, the influence of the military authority increases as a force that can resolve any power struggle. For the benefit of individuals who guarantee the military establishment to maintain their privileges and authority.

Wright Mills' concept of the power elite (the elite of the elite) clearly explains the meaning of the central elite, which can be seen in many third-world countries, and what is meant here is the group of individuals who occupy the highest positions in the political leadership, which is composed of political parties, legislative councils, ministries, and the army (The armed forces leaders) and the economy (prominent businessmen), which do not depend on the balance of power between these elements, but rather gather around the central figure represented by the head of the state, who often possesses absolute power.

Furthermore, let us talk about the competition between the elites that make up the central elite. We must take into account that the early formation of the elite gives it an essential advantage over the elite that is formed later, and this is what gives the military institution in some Arab countries, in which the army contributed to building it, more chances to influence in running the country and this fully applies to the Egyptian military, whose formation began at the time of Muhammad Ali Pasha, specifically in the year 1819, with French assistance.

to be more present in other countries, especially those in which the army played an important role in building the state or liberating it from colonialism. That requires, of course, looking at the historical context in which this relationship was born when studying the relationship between the civilian and the military in society. In some Arab countries the military institution played leading roles in establishing those countries' political power and determining the nature of their orientations, and two basic types can be distinguished.

The first is where the military institution established the state and political authority after waging the war of liberation against colonialism, which applies to Algeria. Historian Mohamed Harbi said: "This army [the Algerian army that transformed from the National Liberation Army into the National People's Army], unlike all the armies of the world, was not made by a state [6].

The army remained in its capacity as a guardian of the state and a guarantor of its continuity, managing the scene through a president whose appointment the army supervises and controls its rhythm, and this can be inferred from the events that took place in 1992 when the first pluralistic parliamentary electoral process in the history of Algeria was halted. The results of the elections were

annulled. The first legislative elections took place on the 26th of December 1991. The Islamic Salvation Front party won the majority of the electoral seats, and the army decided not to hold the second round of elections. As a result, Algeria entered a transitional phase against the backdrop of the resignation of President Shadily Benjedid, whose resignation was described as nothing but a coup-style dismissal. Result in the pressure exerted by the active military elites at the time on President Benjdid to force him to step down from power to prevent the Islamists, represented by the dissolved Salvation Front, from reaching power.

The events are very similar to what happened in Egypt in terms of a coup by the military establishment against the only civilian President who came up with special elections in the history of Egypt. The similarity between the two experiences is represented in the role of the military institution in stopping the electoral process and interfering with annulling the election results, even if the methods of this intervention and its implementation and the exercise of influence differ between the two experiences.

The second is the establishment of republican systems: since the military elites had an impact on the transformation of the nature of many forms of governance in Arab countries, from the monarchy to the republican character, through various coup movements, which brought down many Arab monarchies, and an example of that is the experience of Egypt, in which it was overthrown The Free Officers Organization, led by Major General Muhammad Naguib with King Farouk in 1952; and the experience of Iraq, in which the Free Officers Organization overthrew King Faisal II in 1958; an experiment in which a group of officers, led by Muammar Gaddafi, overthrew King Idris in 1969; The Syrians experienced witnessed a series of military coups, the most important of which was the corrective coup movement led by Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad in 1970.

Results and discussion

After these coups, the armies became politicized and left their barracks under the pretext of correcting the course, always emphasizing that they were forced out for the sake of change with the promise of returning to their barracks after establishing a stable democracy. However, they did not return to the barracks. The struggles of the military and political institutions reproduced their internal coups, accusing traditional politicians of responsibility for failure and political and social corruption. That most of the Arab regimes in the republican countries assumed power and assumed responsibility, based on coup movements, albeit of various forms (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Iraq)

These coup experiences have pushed the existing regimes to the need to find mechanisms to protect them from falling into the trap of military coups once again, represented by creating several preventive and precautionary measures, the most important of which can be stated as follows:

Relying on the criterion of loyalty in the process of military promotions in high ranks, assigning high-level military responsibilities, and assuming senior leadership positions.

Dismantling the national structure of the army. He restricted it to local military units that lacked a leadership structure and lacked a clear, hierarchical, and peaceful structure, apart from submitting to the direct and exclusive leadership of the country's President or to his trusted associates, whom he did not fear of launching a coup movement against him. Gaddafi embodied this model by dismantling the national structure of the Libyan army and transforming it into primarily tribal, local military units. He also, with the help of his sons, monopolized the direct central command of the various military units deployed in the country.

Contrary to Gaddafi's choice to weaken the army, the Egyptian regime chose to strengthen the army until it became the de facto ruler of the country. After the Free Officers Movement in 1952, four presidents came to power, all of whom emerged from the mantle of the army. Since that time, the military has worked to monopolize the political decision in Egypt, so nothing happens without the army being aware of it and with its approval.

During Abdel Nasser's rule, there were about five coup attempts, all of which failed. Despite the strength of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the attractiveness of his personality, and the favorable political conditions that turned him into an Arab leader who is not discussed and cannot be confronted directly, the influence of the Egyptian army could not be neutralized [7].

Weakening the military institution to increase the intelligence institutions' power, thus transforming many regimes that had been established based on coup movements from military regimes to police regimes. However, this was offset by work to limit the margins of armies' intervention in playing political roles. During the time of ousted President Ben Ali, Tunisia embodied this model of dealing with the military establishment to prevent the possibility of its leaders carrying out a military coup. What made the army seem outwardly like a professional institution was that its political roles receded to devote themselves to carrying out the constitutional tasks entrusted to it, mainly representing protecting the country from any external aggression. Furthermore, to an institution with no political roles, not an investigation because of its professionalism. But rather a prevention of the possibility of its leaders carrying out a military coup against the existing regime.

Introducing interlocking, multi-level control mechanisms and activating them over the armed forces. This transformed the army's mission into an army that serves the authority instead of considering it an army for the state, in the sense that it is an army in terms of function, used by the authority or the ruling elite as a mere tool to achieve the sustainability of the political system, the control of the ruling elite, and the suppression of society and the opposition. In another picture, the army appears as a political group in society in the face of political parties. It descends from The army of the state to the army of power [8].

There is no doubt that the end of all free Arab elections with military coups, the most recent of which was Sudan in 1989, Algeria in 1991-1992, Mauritania in 2008, and Egypt in 2013, and the problem of Islamists as a significant political and cultural force in Arab societies and their ambiguous relationship with democracy and negativity in its principles constitute two main dilemmas when discussing democratic transition in our region. We add a third dilemma: the division of Arab political elites and societies and the inability of the existing state institutions to contain them in the event of temporary liberation from tyranny and authoritarian rule. And a fourth dilemma is the politicization of sectarian and ethnic division.

Here, we cannot neglect the role played by the colonial powers in the Arab countries. With the expansion of the Soviet Union after World War II, the victory over Nazism, the attractiveness of its development model, and the Chinese revolution, fear prevailed in Western circles, especially the Americans, of communist expansion in the newly developing and independent third World countries. At this particular stage, the traditional forces on which France and Britain relied the Third World and the Arab world weakened. However, on the other hand, serious forces emerged in the newly independent countries on which American policy bet. Among them, armies emerged as an organized force at the same time. These can hold power, and the cultures of local communities can be used to mobilize against communism. Moreover, the officers are qualified in the best cases to solve the agricultural issue, which precludes the possibility of communism expanding in the name of the peasants' grievances or slipping into social revolutions and making alliances with the communist forces due to backwardness, poverty, and the failure to solve the agricultural issue. Thus, the putschists received support of another kind, which was the support of the Western regimes for the legitimacy of the putschists [9].

The Egyptian experience

In Egypt, the modernization movement began at the hands of Muhammad Ali Pasha by building the army. Muhammad Ali was giving senior officers fiefdoms of land. Thus, the army became an element in building strength and building society at the same time. Mr. Evers explained that the temporal primacy of the strategic group leads to that group occupying a greater position than the group whose appearance is delayed in time. Hence, the dominance of the strategic military group over all other groups can be explained by its early appearance, which led to obtaining the highest degree of gains through the march of society. Its most significant gain was its rise to power and its centralization in decision-making.

The elite officers who carried out the coup against King Farouk (the Free Officers) occupied a central position after 1952 and remained so until the onset of social and economic changes in the mid-1970s. However, its influence continued after that, as it became a source of an influx of new members to

the central and intermediate elites. Therefore, this elite remains the most influential, despite the influx of new elites, such as the business elite, into the circle of political practice [10].

We can add that a constitutional foundation came with the Free Officers assuming the rule of the country. It was enshrined with Sadat's rule in the 1971 constitution with an article that granted privileges to veterans in taking over civil jobs. As a tool to ensure the loyalties of the regime from its senior military (or vice versa, by soft disposal of the military whose loyalty to the head of the regime is suspected), as well as to control the civil administration, especially in its aspect related to the influential ministries, and the local administration. In it, jobs are assigned by direct order issued from the top of the political system.

These jobs are assigned without any review related to the competence of the person appointed to the position or the adoption of competitive procedures between the qualified and the competencies. This resulted in a crowded upper management segment in the Egyptian government, with groups of incompetent and corrupt people unaffected by the law. The matter worsened with the emergence of a balance equation between the institution of the presidency and the military institution that President Hosni Mubarak approved. Moreover, there has become something like a fixed share of the military, concentrated in the upper segment of the influential ministries, both economic and service, in addition to governors and senior leaders in local government bureaus.

Remarkably, military personnel has infiltrated judicial positions and even ministries whose work is traditionally far from the field of interest of this policy, such as communications and information technology, culture, and opera, which supports the claim that the civil state apparatus has fallen into the military grip. With the coup, the matter multiplied until it reached limits that exceeded what happened after the military council dominated power in the aftermath of the overthrow of Mubarak. » The one granted the right to appoint the President of the Republic. Moreover, the matter extended to granting privileges in obtaining jobs to the military's children, destroying the meaning of equality and its constitutional principles. This is in addition to the traditional argument of emergency and security of the country on which the discourse of summoning the military to civilian positions is based. The picture becomes bleaker if the role of the civil sector of the armed forces economy is added to it in dominating the government's business. Its contractors benefit from profiting from the presence of its elements in the ministries managing contracting and public procurement work. The matter reaches farcical cases by intervening in some very critical policies, such as the policy of Fighting liver disease, which is rampant among Egyptians at alarming rates, and even entering incompetent military and intelligence sectors to dominate the contracts for these programs, which are in the billions, and carrying out supplies and contracting for these sensitive sectors, whether as a service provider or a supplier of medicines and devices, without any degree of transparency or enforcement, to competition laws, as well as without any image of the control of this business.

The position of governors of the governorates has become a monopoly on the officers, and even the ruling regime in Egypt went beyond that to appoint officers to positions entirely far from the military, including, for example, the management of the opera house [11].

With the advent of the first anniversary of the election of the first civilian Egyptian President in the history of Egypt, the pressures on President Mohamed Morsi reached their climax, and his opponents organized a series of demonstrations, blessed by the army, demanding that he step down. Two wings of these protests, which led to the killing of thousands of people loyal to President Mohamed Morsi, who was arrested to die in prison amid accusations of his murder by the Akri regime, which returned and assumed the reins of power, to bring down the curtain on the final scene of the Arab Spring play in Egypt.

The Egyptian coup presented researchers with another surprise, which is the service of intellectuals, who associate themselves with democracy and liberalism, for this coup, and this is not a way of fear and piety, but rather a way of marketing and justifying what can be described as the intellectuals' betrayal of democracy.

It is one of the greatest collective betrayals of intellectuals, the most powerful and precise in the twentieth century (and fear and piety may have recently replaced marketing and justification after some of them realized the nature of the coup regime had been tyrannical and coercive, so silence became

evidence of fear). Something similar happened in Algeria nearly three decades ago when modern intellectuals blessed the abortion of the electoral process. The same phenomenon is repeated, and its basis is the fear of the ruling and opposition elites from the rise of new powers with a new political and cultural discourse, which may change not only the rulers but also the foundations of the system and the prevailing way of life. The jihadist Islamists crossed all limits in their violence, not only against the regime but also in their lifestyle-related dictates and the massacres they committed against the peaceful population. Years in what could be called the Algeria syndrome until 2011, which is when the Islamic jihadist currents penetrated some of the Arab revolutions following the failure of the peaceful formula in the face of the bloody regimes (especially the Syrian and Libyan regimes) and squandered the achievement of the Syrian and Libyan people and the achievements of the Arab people recorded in 2011 and their moral superiority over the regimes. In this context, it is worth noting the fact that these jihadist movements, which distorted societies and brought about unprecedented patterns of violence, spread at the stage of the coup against the political process or in the face of the bloody practices of the regimes and the retreat of the popular movement in front of them, or after the collapse of bargaining and negotiations between the post-war political forces - the success of the revolutions.

The Tunisian experience

On the 17th of December, 2010, Tunisians united to topple a 23-year-old dictatorship and ignite hope for change around the region. Even though the successful transition to electoral politics and the adoption of various political reforms, including a new constitution, the hopes and aspirations of Tunisians for more opportunities and justice still needed to be met. On the 23rd of July, 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied, surrounded by army and security leaders, went out on the official Tunisian channel and announced the suspension of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People (Tunisia's Parliament) and fired Prime Minister Hicham Mechichi and the cabinet. President Kais stated that he had based his actions on article 80 of the 2014 Tunisian Constitution. According to this article, in cases of an imminent danger threatening the nation's institutions, security, or independence and hampering the normal functioning of the state, the President of the republic may take any necessary measures to stop such danger after consulting with the head of the government and the speaker of the Parliament and informing the President of the Constitutional Court. The article also requires the President to announce the measures in a statement to the people. In reaction to the President's decision, the speaker of the Parliament, Rached Ghannouchi, accused the President of launching "a full-fledged coup" against the 2011 revolution and constitution. Ghannouchi added, "we consider the government's institutions to be still standing, and supporters of Ennahda and the Tunisian people will defend the revolution." On the other hand, two of the main parties in the Parliament, Heart of Tunisia and Karama, have joined with the Ennahda party, accusing President Saied of staging a coup against the legislative branch. Furthermore, a group of Tunisian lawyers, in reaction to what they perceived as Saied's unconstitutional actions, announced on the 2nd of August that they had established a new organization, the Lawyers for the Protection of Rights and Freedoms, "to monitor violations and abuses of individual and public rights, and to confront them by all legal and legitimate means" a day after ousting the prime minister and suspending Parliament Tunisian President Kais Saied sacked the defense minister Ibrahim Bartaji and acting justice minister Hasna Ben Slimane who is also government spokeswoman, plunging the young democracy into a constitutional crisis.

A statement from the presidency announced the dismissals of Defence Minister Ibrahim Bartaji and acting justice minister Hasna Ben Slimane, a government spokeswoman. Street clashes erupted outside the army-barricaded Parliament after Saied dismissed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and ordered Parliament closed for 30 days, a move the most prominent political party Ennahdha decried as a "coup".

On the 30th of July, Yassin Ayari, a member of Parliament and a known critic of President Saied, was arrested at his house by security forces. President Saied's suspension of the Parliament had stripped lawmakers of their immunity. A military judiciary source said Ayari was imprisoned due to a previous sentence in 2018 that he incurred for criticizing the military. Later on the same day, Maher Zid, another member of Parliament, was detained after being sentenced in 2018 to two years in prison for insulting the late President Beji Caid Essebsi.On the 23rd of August, Saied extended the suspension of Parliament

despite the constitution, which states that Parliament can only be suspended for a month. As a result, concerns were raised about the future of democracy in the country.

On the 22nd of September, Saied issued a decree granting him full presidential powers, allowing him to make changes to Tunisia's constitution and government, including the potential dissolution of the Parliament Earlier that day, Seifeddine Makhlouf and Fayçal Tebbini, both members of Parliament, were jailed.

According to Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, several Tunisian judges' freedom of movement was restricted under various pretexts without appropriate judicial decisions. On the 5th of August, Al-Bashir Al-Akrimi, the former republic's attorney for the First Instance Court in the capital, and Al-Tayeb Rashid, the first president of the Court of Appeal, were placed under house arrest on charges of corruption and collusion with terrorists. In addition, Judge Iman Al-Obaidi, an advisor in the criminal department of the Karmbalia Court of First Instance, was prevented from traveling while on her way to Turkey. The Tunisian scene reminded analysts of what happened in Egypt. However, the Tunisian President, who was elected legally, was the one who carried out the coup, unlike the Egyptian case, where the coup was led by the Minister of Defense, who later became President.

It has become clear that abandoning the privileges achieved by the military and security institutions in the Arab countries is not included in the calculation of these forces. However, they are ready to temporarily give up some of these privileges in favor of civilian forces that accept full cooperation with the military and security forces to tighten their grip on power. Circumventing the Arab Spring in Egypt and then in Tunisia. The coups had terrible political, economic, and social effects. Perhaps the most dangerous of them is the sharp division in the societies that the revolutions brought about. The regimes there resorted to finding an internal enemy by antagonizing part of society to justify State violence against citizens; they divided societies into the bad and good guys.

This brings us back to the words of Zoltan Barani in his book How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why :

Recently, some followers seeking to find common ground between The Arab revolutions should point out that the revolutions failed in the countries in which soldiers were ordered to shoot, while they succeeded in the countries whose rulers did not order the shooting of their citizens. But this conclusion is completely wrong. In the six countries that witnessed widespread violence, every leader commanded the army. Or his security institutions to suppress the protests by force, including lethal force, and in some cases the generals obeyed their political leaders, and in other cases they said no because they saw that regime change might be the best option in view of their own interests, and perhaps the interests of their country as well [12].

There is no doubt that the rapid fall of the Ben Ali regime did not give analysts time to discuss the position that the Tunisian army would take regarding the revolution, so the discussion focused later on the reasons that called for the army to align itself with the revolution, but today it has become clear that predicting the positions of the Arab armies regarding the revolutions was difficult. And that most analysts strayed from the truth in their analyzes.

The massive blackout and media darkness in which those countries and their armies lived was a major reason that researchers and analysts were took by surprise about the revolutions. Gathering reliable information about the Arab republics' apparatus and armies was very difficult. This can be understood if we read the book Yemeni Democracy by one of the few Western academics who can be described as an expert in Yemeni affairs, as within three pages she describes the Yemeni armed forces or the country's military affairs in terms such as "the subject of great controversy, that it is shrouded in secrecy, and that the statistics that The army tells us that it is grossly inaccurate, that the Yemeni army is very mysterious, and that it is an unknown entity. As for the exact numbers, they are impossible to obtain (1) and it is difficult not to empathize with the plight of researchers like Sarah. Until recently, the armed forces appeared in the Middle East and North Africa as a tool completely dedicated to serving the authoritarian regimes they serve. Weaknesses In the study of those armies, many did not believe that those armies were disobeying their political leaders [13].

The post-July 3, 2013 regime created an internal enemy represented by the Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning, then expanded to include all opponents in order to justify its massive violence, whose main goal was to preserve this regime, which led to the division of society into the "enemy", which is The opponents in general, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, partly support this state of hostility, and a third party rejects it. This is what led to the decline of the societal movement from demanding the stages of democratic transformation and caring about how to achieve those demands, to paying attention to the scenes of violence and the state of hostility and its paths, in addition to the subsidiary problems represented in the consequences of this on the attempt to return to the democratic path of the 25th of January revolution.

As the state's violence persists greatly, one of its consequences will be the emergence of waves of counter-violence, whether in momentary violence or in the emergence of violent groups whose reference and political vision differ but agree to direct their violence against the state and its tools. Violence groups and systems that resort to it are usually similar in terms of target groups. Each of them transforms a group within society into its target group, and each of them enters into a zero-sum battle against the other based on complete certainty about the validity of his position and without regard to the repercussions of this on the future or on How to coexist after these violent incidents. This is accompanied by the escalation of community members' acceptance of the culture of violence to solve their political, economic, and social problems, whether collectively or individually, which leads to transforming society into a violent society.

Conclusion

The shape of Arab politics is rapidly evolving thanks to regional and international changes and internal developments that have been accelerated since the end of the second Gulf war. Arab regimes are now more aware of popular dissatisfaction and the support by several Arab regimes for the US war campaign has only put more pressure on the ruling regimes. Symbolic and superficial changes have been introduced in most Arab countries. State-sponsored councils and committees have been sprouting at a rapid rate in many countries, including in the Gulf region where identication with Shariah was all that the regimes were willing to submit to.

Recommendations

- Take the long view of democratization prospects for the Arab world. Democratization is a complex, multi-dimensional process and can take many years to unfold. Foreign assistance and pressure should be steady over a lengthy period of time. Taking a long view, there are reasons for optimism: Factors tending to contribute to or undermine democratization are not deterministic; democracy has spread to extremely varied terrain around the world, including places previously thought unsuitable; and many transitions have been turbulent and still succeeded.

- Support institutional reform. Restructuring of political processes and institutions has been crucial to successful democratization. Development of civilian control of security institutions should especially be encouraged. This can be done through new or continued help in professionalizing militaries, reforming police organizations, and improving parliamentary oversight. Police reform is particularly important because police interact closely with the population and can affect a public's calculation of the extent to which democracy has brought real change.

- Building civil society should also be a priority. Civil society institutions have often helped propel democratization. Aid to independent organizations promoting democracy as well as independent media, anti-corruption and human rights monitoring groups, and organizations that provide civic education should be considered.

- Encourage creation of mutually reinforcing and supporting structures. Regional structures that create governmental and civil society connections among new democracies could facilitate the delivery of practical institution-building assistance and reinforce democratization through moral suasion. Channeling Western assistance through a regional organization may also be politically more palatable than bilateral assistance for some countries.

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