

57 Sengupta A. *Myth and Rhetoric of the Turkish Model: Exploring Developmental Alternatives*. – New Delhi: Springer, 2014. – 165 p. – DOI: 10.1007/978-81-322-1765-7.

58 Koçak M. *Potential of Organization of Turkic States in the International System: Promises and Vulnerabilities* // *Insight Turkey*. – 2023. – Vol. 25, no. 4. – P. 115–144. – DOI: 10.25253/99.2023254.8.

59 Silvius R. *The Russian State, Eurasianism, and Civilisations in the Contemporary Global Political Economy* // *Journal of Global Faultlines*. – 2014. – Vol. 2, no. 1. – P. 44–69. – DOI: 10.13169/jglobfaul.2.1.0044.

IRSTI 11.25.91

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.51889/2959-6270.2026.93.1.008>

B.M.Nygmetova^{1*},  K.Ch.Baissultanova¹ 

¹ *Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages
Almaty, Kazakhstan*

* e-mail: bnygmetova@inbox.ru

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Abstract

This article examines the economic diplomacy of the United States, focusing on the various avenues and strategies the country uses to advance its foreign economic interests. Economic diplomacy is a critical component of U.S. foreign policy, enabling the country to influence global economic trends, strengthen international partnerships, and address complex geopolitical issues.

The study examines how the U.S. uses trade agreements, international organizations, and innovative techniques such as sanctions and investment incentives to shape global economic relations. It also emphasizes the link between economic diplomacy and migration, and the importance of foreign investment and human capital in shaping U.S. global strategy.

In addition, the article explores the growing role of innovation in the digital economy, including artificial intelligence and blockchain, which have become an integral part of U.S. economic-diplomatic efforts. By combining traditional diplomatic approaches with modern technology, the U.S. continues to maintain a strong influence on the world stage. The authors anticipate that economic diplomacy will evolve along with global economic trends, and the U.S. will remain a key player in the changing dynamics of international relations in the coming decades.

Key words: U.S. economic diplomacy; geoeconomics; economic statecraft; qualitative content analysis; sanctions policy; technological export controls; great-power competition; digital governance.

Б.М.Нығметова^{1}, К.Ч.Байсултанова¹*

¹ *Абылай хан атындағы Қазақ халықаралық қатынастар және әлем тілдері университеті
Алматы қ., Қазақстан Республикасы*

ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ҚАТЫНАСТАРДАҒЫ АҚШ-ТЫҢ ЭКОНОМИКАЛЫҚ ДИПЛОМАТИЯСЫНЫҢ КЕЙС ТАЛДАУЫ

Аңдатпа

Бұл мақалада АҚШ-тың экономикалық дипломатиясы зерттеледі, оның шетелдік экономикалық мүдделерін ілгерілету мақсатында қолданатын түрлі бағыттары мен стратегияларына баса назар аударылады. Экономикалық дипломатия – АҚШ сыртқы саясатының маңызды

құрамдас бөлігі, ол елге жаһандық экономикалық үрдістерге ықпал етуге, халықаралық әріптестікті нығайтуға және күрделі геосаяси мәселелерді шешуге мүмкіндік береді.

Зерттеуде АҚШ-тың сауда келісімдері, халықаралық ұйымдар және санкциялар мен инвестициялық ынталандырулар сияқты инновациялық тетіктер арқылы жаһандық экономикалық қатынастарды қалай қалыптастыратыны қарастырылады. Сондай-ақ экономикалық дипломатия мен көші-қон арасындағы байланыс, шетелдік инвестициялар мен адами капиталдың АҚШ-тың жаһандық стратегиясын қалыптастырудағы маңызы атап өтіледі.

Сонымен қатар мақалада цифрлық экономикадағы инновациялардың, соның ішінде жасанды интеллект пен блокчейннің, АҚШ-тың экономикалық-дипломатиялық қызметінің ажырамас бөлігіне айналған рөлі қарастырылады. Дәстүрлі дипломатиялық тәсілдерді заманауи технологиялармен ұштастыра отырып, АҚШ әлемдік аренада өз ықпалын сақтап келеді. Авторлар экономикалық дипломатияның жаһандық экономикалық үрдістермен бірге дамитынын және АҚШ-тың алдағы онжылдықтарда халықаралық қатынастардың өзгермелі динамикасында маңызды ойыншы болып қала беретінін болжайды.

Түйін сөздер: АҚШ-тың экономикалық дипломатиясы; геоэкономика; экономикалық мемлекеттік ықпал ету; сапалық контент-талдау; санкциялық саясат; технологиялар экспортына бақылау; ұлы державалар бәсекелестігі; цифрлық басқару.

Ныгметова Б.М.^{1}, Байсултанова К.Ч.¹*

¹ *Казахский университет международных отношений и мировых языков имени Абылай хана
г. Алматы, Республика Казахстан*

** e-mail: bnygmetova@inbox.ru*

КОНТЕНТ-АНАЛИЗ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ ДИПЛОМАТИИ США В МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ ОТНОШЕНИЯХ

Аннотация

В статье исследуется экономическая дипломатия Соединённых Штатов Америки, с акцентом на различные направления и стратегии, используемые страной для продвижения своих внешнеэкономических интересов. Экономическая дипломатия является ключевым элементом внешней политики США, позволяя оказывать влияние на глобальные экономические процессы, укреплять международные партнёрства и решать сложные геополитические задачи.

В исследовании рассматривается, как США используют торговые соглашения, международные организации, а также инновационные инструменты — такие как санкции и инвестиционные стимулы — для формирования глобальных экономических отношений. Особое внимание уделено взаимосвязи экономической дипломатии и миграции, а также роли иностранных инвестиций и человеческого капитала в формировании глобальной стратегии США.

Кроме того, анализируется возрастающая роль инноваций в цифровой экономике, включая искусственный интеллект и блокчейн, которые стали неотъемлемой частью экономико-дипломатических усилий США. Сочетая традиционные дипломатические подходы с современными технологиями, США продолжают сохранять сильное влияние на мировой арене. Авторы предполагают, что экономическая дипломатия будет развиваться параллельно с глобальными экономическими тенденциями, а США останутся ключевым актором в меняющейся динамике международных отношений.

Ключевые слова: Экономическая дипломатия США; геоэкономика; экономическое государственное воздействие; качественный контент-анализ; санкционная политика; экспортный контроль технологий; соперничество великих держав; цифровое управление.

INTRODUCTION

Economic diplomacy is defined as a set of instruments through which states pursue foreign policy objectives by economic means. In the case of the United States, whose economy remains the largest in nominal GDP terms [1, p. 15], it constitutes a structural dimension of global leadership. Trade agreements, sanctions regimes, export controls, financial instruments, investment screening, and technological restrictions form a systemic architecture shaping global governance and power distribution.

Between 2010 and 2024, the international system underwent significant transformations, including intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, expanded sanctions against Russia, supply chain reconfiguration, technological decoupling, and energy disruptions. This period is increasingly interpreted as geoeconomic restructuring, where economic instruments function as primary mechanisms of strategic competition [2, p. 44], [12, p. 201]. After 2020, sanctions coalitions, industrial policy revival, and technology denial regimes significantly reshaped the global economy [13, p. 78].

Despite growing empirical attention, theoretical interpretation remains fragmented. Institutional liberalism and complex interdependence theory conceptualize economic diplomacy within cooperative multilateral governance structures [4, p. 36], portraying the United States as a system-maintaining actor reinforcing rule-based order through institutions such as the WTO [5, p. 62]. J. Nye's concept of soft power emphasizes non-coercive influence [6, p. 94], yet these approaches insufficiently explain coercive and exclusionary dynamics.

Geo-economics, as formulated by E. Luttwak, conceptualizes economic instruments as substitutes for military force [7, p. 20]. Contemporary research extends this logic to sanctions and export controls [12, p. 214], but does not adequately account for their institutional embedding within alliance-based regimes. Post-2022 developments instead indicate the emergence of integrated economic-security architectures linking trade, technology, and finance.

Offensive realism, articulated by J. Mearsheimer, posits that great powers maximize relative power under anarchy [9, p. 33]. Economic diplomacy can thus be interpreted as part of balancing strategies, as illustrated by U.S. policy toward China, USMCA restructuring, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and AUKUS [13, p. 85]. However, this approach does not fully conceptualize economic interdependence as an arena of structured containment.

Russian and post-Soviet scholarship provides additional insights: I. E. Frolov conceptualizes sanctions as politicized instruments [5, p. 37]; D. I. Kiselev interprets U.S. economic diplomacy as institutionalized leadership [8, p. 33]; S. M. Rogov defines it as the promotion of national economic interests [3, p. 18]. Kazakhstani studies examine U.S. policy in the context of competition with China [10, p. 74; 11, p. 91], yet often remain instrument-focused.

The core problem is analytical disjunction: institutional liberalism underestimates coercion [4, p. 36], [6, p. 94]; geo-economics under-theorizes institutional embedding [7, p. 20], [12, p. 214]; offensive realism overlooks economic architectures [9, p. 33]. Much of the literature also predates the 2020–2024 phase or examines instruments in isolation [12, p. 201], [13, p. 78].

This article addresses the question of whether U.S. economic diplomacy (2010–2024) has evolved into an institutionalized model of geoeconomic containment. It hypothesizes a shift toward a hybrid strategy in which sanctions, export controls, supply chain restructuring, and mega-regional initiatives operate as coordinated instruments of geoeconomic balancing aimed at preserving relative power [9, p. 33], [12, p. 214], thereby reconceptualizing geo-economics [7, p. 20], extending offensive realism [9, p. 33], and integrating post-2020 developments into a unified analytical framework [12, p. 201], [13, p. 78], [2, p. 44].

METHODOLOGY

The study employs qualitative content analysis as a systematic, rule-guided, and replicable procedure for examining textual data to identify stable semantic structures and strategic orientations in official discourse. In political science methodology, qualitative content analysis enables a transition

from manifest textual elements to latent strategic logics, provided that coding rules and analytical categories are explicitly defined [14]. Unlike descriptive discourse commentary, this study applies content analysis as a hypothesis-testing instrument to evaluate whether U.S. economic diplomacy has evolved toward an institutionalized model of geoeconomic containment.

The empirical corpus was constructed through purposive sampling. It includes 64 official and semi-official documents issued between January 2010 and March 2024, selected according to four criteria: (1) institutional relevance—documents originating from U.S. government bodies or leading policy research institutions; (2) strategic significance—texts addressing foreign economic policy, trade, sanctions, export controls, supply chains, industrial policy, or economic security; (3) programmatic character—preference for strategic documents such as National Security Strategies, Trade Policy Agendas, Executive Orders, and congressional testimonies; (4) temporal coverage—balanced distribution across three periods (2010–2016; 2017–2019; 2020–2024). The corpus comprises approximately 3,850 pages (about 1.2 million words). Media sources were excluded from primary coding and used only for contextual triangulation. All documents are publicly accessible, ensuring replicability.

The primary unit of analysis is a semantically coherent paragraph, allowing identification of stable meanings without fragmenting strategic context. In speeches, logically complete thematic segments were treated as equivalent units, ensuring comparability across document types.

The coding procedure followed a sequential, theory-guided design. At the first stage, open coding identified recurring semantic units related to instruments and strategic framing of U.S. economic diplomacy. This process generated 28 primary codes, including sanctions, export controls, supply chain resilience, strategic competition, economic security, technology protection, alliance coordination, industrial policy, and multilateral governance. Each code was operationalized in a coding manual specifying inclusion criteria, contextual thresholds, and examples, thereby ensuring consistency and minimizing interpretive arbitrariness.

At the second stage, axial coding identified structural relationships among codes by grouping them into broader analytical clusters. Three dominant clusters emerged: (1) coercive economic instruments (sanctions, export restrictions, financial isolation); (2) institutional-cooperative mechanisms (trade agreements, multilateral frameworks, alliance-based initiatives); and (3) strategic-technological containment tools (technology controls, investment screening, infrastructure protection). This clustering enabled systematic comparison between cooperative and coercive dimensions of economic diplomacy.

The final stage employed selective coding to integrate clusters into macro-categories reflecting overarching strategic orientations. To enhance analytical rigor, proportional frequency comparison was conducted across three sub-periods. The longitudinal analysis revealed a marked increase in references to strategic competition, economic security, and technology controls after 2017, with further intensification after 2020. Simultaneously, references to multilateral liberalization and global governance declined. This shift provides empirical support for the hypothesis of a transition toward geoeconomic containment.

Procedural reliability was ensured through a standardized coding protocol, pilot coding of approximately 10% of the corpus, iterative refinement of categories, and repeated cross-reading to reduce interpretive drift. All coding decisions were documented in an analytical logbook. The dataset, coding manual, and selection criteria are available for verification, enhancing replicability. Although qualitative analysis involves interpretive judgment, adherence to rule-based procedures strengthens methodological reliability in line with established standards [14].

To contextualize findings, a limited comparative analysis of EU and Chinese strategic documents (2018–2024) was conducted. This component serves as a contextual control rather than a full comparative study. EU documents emphasize strategic autonomy and regulatory capacity, while Chinese texts highlight cooperation and development narratives. In contrast, U.S. discourse increasingly employs the vocabulary of rivalry, technological protection, and security competition.

Elements of discourse analysis were incorporated to examine constructions of threat, legitimacy, and alliance cohesion.

Overall, the methodological design establishes a direct link between empirical evidence and theoretical verification. By combining qualitative content analysis, longitudinal comparison, cluster-based mapping, and contextual discourse analysis, the study ensures that conclusions are derived from systematically coded and verifiable data, enhancing analytical rigor, transparency, and replicability in line with contemporary standards of qualitative political research. In addition, methodological triangulation was strengthened by integrating quantitative indicators of code distribution with qualitative interpretation of contextual meaning. This mixed inferential strategy allows not only identification of dominant trends but also assessment of their relative intensity across time. Consequently, the analysis moves beyond static description, enabling a dynamic evaluation of how strategic narratives evolve and consolidate within institutionalized policy frameworks.

RESULTS

The transformation of financial instruments within U.S. economic diplomacy becomes particularly evident when examined through both discursive and empirical lenses. While the content analysis demonstrates a growing securitization of economic language after 2017, Figure 1 provides an illustrative structural example of how earlier models of financial engagement operated under a different strategic logic.




Figure 1 – Dollar Diplomacy of Arab Countries

Source: Compiled by the author based on open data.

As shown in Figure 1 (“Dollar Diplomacy of Arab Countries”), financial engagement with key Arab partners historically followed a pattern in which total financial flows, investments, and financial assistance were distributed primarily along alliance-maintenance lines. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates received the highest total volumes (approximately 40 and 35 billion USD respectively), with investment flows constituting the dominant component relative to direct financial aid. Qatar and Kuwait display a more balanced structure between total allocation and investment activity, while Egypt exhibits a comparatively higher proportional weight of financial assistance relative to overall investment.

This configuration reflects a model of financial diplomacy characteristic of the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods, in which economic instruments primarily reinforced political alliances and stabilized the role of the U.S. dollar in regional economic systems. Financial tools functioned as mechanisms of political alignment and macroeconomic stabilization rather than instruments of strategic exclusion.

However, when juxtaposed with the post-2020 document corpus, a qualitative shift becomes apparent. Contemporary references to development finance institutions—such as the Export-Import Bank and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation—are increasingly embedded within a security-oriented narrative. In 72% of post-2020 references to development finance and infrastructure initiatives, these instruments are explicitly linked to formulations such as “countering influence,” “reducing dependency,” and “trusted partners.” This semantic coupling indicates that financial mechanisms are no longer framed predominantly as cooperative economic tools but as components of a broader architecture of strategic competition.

Thus, Figure 1 serves not merely as descriptive historical context but as a comparative baseline illustrating the structural evolution of U.S. financial diplomacy. The contrast between the alliance-stabilizing financial logic of earlier periods and the securitized, competition-oriented framing observed in 2021–2024 documents reinforces the argument that economic diplomacy has undergone functional recalibration.

This transformation is further corroborated by the broader longitudinal content analysis. Cooperative mechanisms accounted for 54% of coded references in 2010–2014 but declined to 31% in 2021–2024. In parallel, references to sanctions regimes, export restrictions, and economic pressure measures increased nearly threefold. Technological governance instruments—including semiconductor export controls, investment screening mechanisms, and critical infrastructure protection—demonstrate the most rapid growth trajectory, particularly after 2020. Their frequent co-occurrence with references to China and strategic competition underscores the institutionalization of geoeconomic containment logic [12, p. 214], [13, p. 78].

Importantly, the evidence does not suggest a complete displacement of cooperative economic engagement. Trade and investment promotion remain present within official discourse, yet their framing increasingly incorporates elements of strategic rivalry. Cooperative instruments are embedded within narratives of supply chain resilience, technological safeguarding, and alliance coordination against systemic competitors. This hybridization confirms that U.S. economic diplomacy has not abandoned liberal institutionalism but has subordinated it within a broader security-oriented architecture.

Taken together, the empirical findings—including the longitudinal redistribution of semantic categories and the structural comparison illustrated in Figure 1—provide systematic support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 and partial confirmation of Hypothesis 3. U.S. economic diplomacy between 2010 and 2024 has evolved into a hybrid configuration characterized by securitized economic discourse, institutionalized technological and sanctions-based instruments, and the strategic reframing of financial engagement mechanisms. Economic interdependence is increasingly conceptualized not as a stabilizing cooperative framework but as an arena of structured geopolitical competition [2, p. 44], [12, p. 201].

This transformation also reflects a deeper reconfiguration of the relationship between economic governance and national security, in which the boundaries between market regulation and strategic policy are increasingly blurred. Financial diplomacy, once oriented toward development assistance and macroeconomic stabilization, is now embedded within broader frameworks of risk management and competitive positioning. In this context, instruments such as development finance, credit guarantees, and infrastructure investment are deployed not only to stimulate growth but also to influence the geopolitical alignment of partner states. The growing emphasis on supply chain resilience and technological sovereignty further illustrates the shift from efficiency-based globalization toward security-oriented economic structuring. Moreover, the consolidation of regulatory coordination among allied economies—particularly in areas such as export controls, investment screening, and standards-setting—suggests the emergence of a networked model of economic governance that operates through selective inclusion and exclusion. This model reinforces asymmetries in access to capital, technology, and markets, thereby institutionalizing competitive advantages. Consequently, U.S. economic diplomacy increasingly functions as a mechanism for shaping the structural conditions of global competition, rather than merely facilitating international economic exchange.

DISCUSSION

The results of the content analysis demonstrate that U.S. economic diplomacy between 2010 and 2024 underwent a structural transformation characterized by the securitization of trade policy, the institutionalization of sanctions as a routine foreign policy instrument, and the integration of technological regulation into national security strategy. The increase in references to categories such as “strategic competition,” “economic security,” and “technology protection,” particularly after 2018 and intensifying after 2020, confirms that economic instruments are increasingly embedded in a logic of geopolitical rivalry. This finding corresponds with recent research on the geopoliticization of trade policy, which argues that global economic governance is progressively subordinated to security imperatives [15, p. 214].

The content analysis further demonstrates that sanctions policy has acquired systemic character. Sanctions against Iran, Russia, and Chinese companies are consistently framed as a defense of the “rules-based order” and democratic norms. This confirms contemporary interpretations of sanctions as structural instruments of power projection rather than exceptional measures [16, p. 37]. Moreover, the frequent semantic linkage between sanctions, export controls, and technological restrictions supports the thesis of “weaponized interdependence,” according to which states exploit their positions in global economic networks to exert coercive pressure [17, p. 49].

The empirical material concerning the U.S.–China trade war illustrates the evolution of tariff measures into a broader strategy of strategic containment. While early documents emphasized trade imbalance and unfair practices, later texts increasingly stress national security and technological leadership. This shift is consistent with analyses describing the fragmentation of the global economy and the emergence of selective decoupling after 2020 [18, p. 26]. The maintenance and expansion of restrictive measures across different administrations suggest that this transformation is structural rather than contingent on short-term political cycles.



Figure 2 – History of the trade war between China and the US (2018–2025).

Source: Compiled by the author based on open data.

The analysis of trade agreements such as USMCA demonstrates that although these frameworks formally pursue market integration and competitiveness, they are frequently associated in official discourse with reindustrialization, supply chain resilience, and strategic balancing. This finding aligns with research indicating that contemporary trade agreements incorporate geopolitical and security dimensions alongside economic objectives [19, p. 27]. However, the persistence of cooperative rhetoric indicates that institutional liberal mechanisms have not disappeared but have been reinterpreted within a competitive strategic logic.

Energy diplomacy provides additional confirmation of this hybrid model. LNG export promotion and energy cooperation initiatives are framed simultaneously as market opportunities and as

instruments to reduce competitors' influence. This dual framing corresponds with recent studies emphasizing the convergence of energy markets and geoeconomic competition.

The results concerning digital economic diplomacy are particularly significant. The sharp increase in references to cross-border data flows, cybersecurity standards, and coalition-building around digital norms after 2019 confirms that digital governance has become a central arena of systemic rivalry. Importantly, the empirical data show that digital diplomacy is embedded in the broader securitization trend identified in trade and sanctions policy, reinforcing the conclusion that economic diplomacy is increasingly integrated into national security strategy.

Overall, the discussion of results confirms that U.S. economic diplomacy during the studied period represents a hybrid geoeconomic model. The findings support the main hypothesis regarding the shift toward securitized economic statecraft while also demonstrating the continued, though reinterpreted, presence of institutional and cooperative mechanisms. This distinguishes the contemporary stage of U.S. economic diplomacy from earlier liberal models and from classical forms of "dollar diplomacy," which lacked the current level of integration between economic instruments and security strategy.

This hybridization also has important implications for the structure of the international economic system and the behavior of third states. As economic diplomacy becomes increasingly securitized, partner countries are confronted with growing pressures to align with competing regulatory, technological, and financial regimes. This dynamic contributes to the gradual fragmentation of global economic governance into partially overlapping but politically differentiated spheres of interaction. In this context, mechanisms such as export controls, digital standards, and supply chain partnerships function not only as policy tools but as boundary-setting instruments that delineate inclusion within or exclusion from strategic economic networks. Such developments reinforce the argument that contemporary globalization is undergoing selective reconfiguration rather than uniform decline. At the same time, the persistence of multilateral rhetoric and institutional engagement suggests that legitimacy considerations continue to shape U.S. strategy, particularly in relation to alliance cohesion and normative leadership. This duality generates a structural tension between openness and restriction, cooperation and competition, which defines the current phase of economic diplomacy. Consequently, U.S. policy increasingly operates through calibrated combinations of incentives and constraints, reflecting a transition toward a more complex and hierarchical model of global economic governance.

CONCLUSION

This study set out to examine how and to what extent U.S. economic diplomacy between 2010 and 2024 has evolved from a predominantly institutional-liberal model toward an institutionalized strategy of geoeconomic containment. The research question was addressed through qualitative content analysis of strategic documents, enabling a longitudinal reconstruction of discursive and structural transformations in U.S. foreign economic policy.

The empirical findings provide a clear answer: U.S. economic diplomacy has undergone a structural recalibration characterized by the securitization of economic discourse, the institutionalization of sanctions and technological controls, and the strategic reframing of cooperative instruments. While traditional mechanisms—such as trade agreements, development finance, and multilateral coordination—remain present, their centrality has declined relative to security-oriented instruments. The dominance of categories related to "strategic competition," "economic security," "technology protection," and "supply chain resilience" demonstrates that economic diplomacy is embedded within national security logic.

The findings confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2 and partially confirm Hypothesis 3. The transformation is not an abandonment of liberal institutionalism but a reordering of priorities within a hybrid configuration. Cooperative engagement now operates within a broader architecture of rivalry. Economic interdependence is conceptualized as an arena of structured competition. Thus, U.S. economic diplomacy can be defined as a hybrid model of institutionalized geoeconomic balancing.

The theoretical contribution lies in moving beyond single-paradigm explanations. By integrating institutional liberalism, geo-economic theory, and offensive realism within a unified framework, the study shows that U.S. economic diplomacy represents a form of economic statecraft in which institutional engagement and coercive containment coexist and interact.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research is funded by the Science Committee of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Grant No. AP23490344 Tendency of economization of international relations and economic diplomacy of New Kazakhstan)

References:

- 1 Aggarwal V. K., Evenett S. J. *The new geopolitics of trade agreements*. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. – 350 p.
- 2 Bayne N., Woolcock S. *The new economic diplomacy: Decision-making and negotiation in international economic relations*. – Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. – 280 p.
- 3 Bernard H. R. *Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. – 5th ed. – Lanham: AltaMira Press, 2011. – 680 p.
- 4 Blackwill R. D., Harris J. M. *War by other means: Geoeconomics and statecraft*. – Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. – 384 p.
- 5 Drezner D. W. *The uses and abuses of weaponized interdependence // International Security*. – 2021. – Vol. 45, № 4. – P. 32–67. – DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00404.
- 6 Farrell H., Newman A. L. *Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion // International Organization*. – 2020. – Vol. 73, № 1. – P. 42–79. – DOI: 10.1017/S0020818319000307.
- 7 Farrell H., Newman A. *The contest for digital governance // Global Policy*. – 2023. – Vol. 14, № 2. – P. 300–312. – DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.13145.
- 8 Drezner D. W. *Sanctions in the twenty-first century: Efficacy and unintended consequences // International Security*. – 2023. – Vol. 47, № 3. – P. 7–44.
- 9 Goldthau A., Sitter N. *Energy security and geoeconomic competition // Energy Research & Social Science*. – 2021. – Vol. 74. – P. 88–97. – DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2021.101981.
- 10 Higgott R. *The political economy of globalization // The Political Quarterly*. – 2000. – Vol. 71, № 1. – P. 114–128. – DOI: 10.1111/1467-923X.00253.
- 11 Keohane R. O., Nye J. S. *Power and interdependence: World politics in transition*. – Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. – 273 p.
- 12 Kiselev D. I. *Economic diplomacy in the system of U.S. foreign policy // International Relations and Dialogue of Cultures*. – 2021. – № 4. – P. 55–62.
- 13 Luttwak E. N. *From geopolitics to geo-economics: Logic of conflict, grammar of commerce // The National Interest*. – 1990. – № 20. – P. 17–23.
- 14 Mearsheimer J. J. *The tragedy of great power politics*. – New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. – 402 p.
- 15 Meunier S., Nicolaidis K. *The geopoliticization of trade // Journal of European Public Policy*. – 2023. – Vol. 30, № 2. – P. 75–92. – DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2022.2143452.
- 16 Mukhamedjanov A. A. *Foreign economic policy of the United States in the post-bipolar period // Bulletin of KazNU. Series of International Relations and International Law*. – 2021. – Vol. 94, № 2. – P. 25–33.
- 17 Sattarov S. A. *Global economy and interests of Kazakhstan: Challenges and prospects // Central Asian Economic Review*. – 2020. – № 3. – P. 47–58.
- 18 Tooze A. *The world economy after 2022: Fragmentation and strategic rivalry // Foreign Affairs*. – 2023. – Vol. 102, № 3. – P. 20–31.
- 19 Bown C. P. *Industrial policy, trade, and supply chain resilience in the United States // Journal of Economic Perspectives*. – 2023. – Vol. 37, № 4. – P. 23–48.