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## РЕСЕЙ-АҚШ ҚАРЫМ-ҚАТЫНАСЫНЫҢ ҚАЗАҚСТАНҒА ЫҚПАЛЫ: АКАДЕМИЯЛЫҚ ҚАУЫМ ДӘЙЕКТЕРІ

### *Аңдатпа*

Ресей мен АҚШ арасындағы қиын қарым-қатынас табиғи құбылыс, АҚШ әкімшілігінің соғыстан кейінгі әлемде американдық үстемдігін орнатуға бағытталған саналы саясатының және Ресей билеуші элитасының күн санап өсіп келе жатқан кек іздеуші саясатының нәтижесі.

Бұл мақала әлемдік аренада АҚШ гегемониясының әлсіреуі және оның ықпал ету саласын сақтап қалу үшін пайдасыз әрекеттері аясында қатынастардың нашарлауы мен қазіргі кезеңдегі АҚШ-Ресей қарым-қатынастарының Қазақстанның саясаты мен экономикасына әсерін бағалауға арналған.

**Түйін сөздер:** сыртқы саясат, конфронтация, халықаралық қатынастар, Ресей, АҚШ

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## INFLUENCE OF US-RUSSIA RELATIONS ON KAZAKHSTAN: ACADEMIC COMMUNITY EVIDENCE

### *Abstract*

The difficult relationship between Russia and the United States is a natural phenomenon, the result of a conscious policy of the US administration aimed at establishing American dominance in the post-war world and the ever-increasing revenge-seeking policies of the Russian ruling elite.

This article is designed to assess the impact of the US-Russia relationship on Kazakhstan's politics and economy at the present stage, after the deterioration of relations in the framework of the weakening of US hegemony in the world arena and its futile attempts to maintain its sphere of influence.

**Key words:** foreign policy, confrontation, international relations, Russia, USA

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## ВЛИЯНИЕ ВЗАИМООТНОШЕНИЙ РФ-США НА КАЗАХСТАН: ДОКАЗАТЕЛЬСТВА АКАДЕМИЧЕСКОГО СООБЩЕСТВА

*Аннотация*

Трудные взаимоотношения России и США, является закономерным явлением, результатом сознательной политики администрации США, направленной на установление американского господства в послевоенном мире и все возрастающей реваншистской политики российской правящей элиты.

Данная статья призвана оценить влияние взаимоотношении США-Россия на Казахстанскую политику и экономику в современном этапе, после ухудшения отношений в рамках ослабления гегемонии США в мировой арене и его тщетные попытки сохранить сферы своего влияния.

**Ключевые слова:** внешняя политика, конфронтация, международные отношения, Россия, США

**Introduction.**

The current situation in Kazakhstan's policy remains not completely clear in connection with the adopted course of a multi-vector foreign policy and changing under the influence of the global domestic policy trend. In the new conditions, Kazakhstan has good opportunities to take a position in the global economy and politics. But for this, the Kazakhstani elite must understand the following transformational processes of the new world order:

(i) A remarkable feature of the modern international system is the gradual softening of its internal hierarchy. Today we see how it is gradually becoming more and more varied and multifaceted, it is subject to various kinds of fluctuations. "Ranking" in international affairs is not determined by the once and for all fixed pattern - as it would be, say, in a unipolar world. A non-rigid system can change its configuration and structure, line up differently depending on many circumstances. This can, for example, be influenced by the characteristics of the specific sphere in question; the balance of forces in it (and in other areas); the nature of the relationship between the states involved; exposure to other contributing factors. This in itself is a rather controversial phenomenon - because the internal hierarchy forms the core, the skeleton of any systemic formation, and its erosion, it would seem, puts it at risk. The "kaleidoscopic" nature of the hierarchy in international relations can be a source of tension, creating the potential for instability both at the global level and in individual regional segments of the world system. But this circumstance gives the latter additional flexibility and makes it easier to adapt to new problem situations.

The emergence of a more labile hierarchy does not necessarily become the prevailing characteristic of the international system. It is unlikely that there will be talk of an irreversible phenomenon. Here, presumably, two factors will turn out to be a key factor - the general structuring of international relations, as well as the growth of economic and political interdependence. Of course, it is important not to harbor too much illusion. Even if the international system gains more flexibility and variability, there is hardly any reason to believe that there will be less problematic situations and acute conflicts to which it should respond. All the reasons why they arose earlier will continue to generate them.

However, if we consider the specified dynamics in the most general terms, we can assume that the main intrigue will begin to unfold along two trajectories. The first concerns the establishment of a new configuration and balance of power at the global and regional levels. The second is "center-periphery" relations across their widest spectrum (including here technologies, information, resources, financial instruments, human capital, movement of people, security, etc.) The challenge that arises today for the participants in international life is to adjust the global balance of the system in combination with maintaining the complex and contradictory dynamics of relations within its regional segments. [1]

(ii) The problems caused by the current or possible future international-political delimitations of the system level will not disappear anywhere. They have already been mentioned above. In the one that goes along the Russia-West line, different factors come together - both indicative of mutual dissatisfaction regarding the course of development after the end of the Cold War, and stemming from geopolitical rivalry, and related to internal political dynamics. The range of issues on which there is a mutual rejection of the parties tends to expand - from NATO's eastward movement, rivalry for the post-Soviet space, events in Ukraine and the situation in Syria. The cooperative part of the spectrum of possible relationships becomes marginal and almost taboo. The chances of her promotion have not disappeared at all, but they are becoming less and less. And there is no particular hope that the situation will succeed if desired, when a political impulse arises, to rectify quickly and with little effort. Mutual trust is lost easily, and acquired hard and long [2]. In article "Ideological bases of Russia and Turkey policies" authors concluding that:

*“Russia pursuing policy aimed at straightening their positions on the world stage, which is often perceived as an attempt to restore imperial power” [3].*

Another dividing line at the system level was designated between China, on the one hand, and the United States with its allies (primarily Asian), on the other hand. It can become an even more significant marker, pushing the vicissitudes of the “Russian U-turn” into the background. Both delimitations can be complementary. And with the involvement of the CSTO / SCO / BRICS lead to the constitution of an economic and political counterbalance to the West. At the same time, the logic embedded in this variant of bipolarity is balanced by quite powerful economic and political imperatives. For key SCO / BRICS countries (Russia, China, India), economic cooperation with the West and receiving investments and the latest technologies from it are highly significant. It is not obvious that they will be ready to oppose this factor to the line on the priority maintenance of relations with each other. There are also contradictions within the mentioned structures (China – India, India – Pakistan, between the countries of Central Asia) - sometimes more acute than between the member states and the West. So with all the attractiveness of the idea of forming an alternative international system of politically motivated desire to challenge the “old establishment”, this may not be enough.

Finally, let us mention one more theoretically possible variant of a system-level fault, which could have developed on the basis of counteraction to Islamic radicalism. Probably, this line, if we start from some speculative assumptions, would even be able to bring Russia, the West and China together. But such a too far-reaching hypothesis clearly does not find confirmation in practice. Although fears about the threat posed by radical (extremist) Islamism are widespread, its opponents remain very far from becoming real allies - neither in a trilateral, nor even in a bilateral configuration.

(iii) For the level of the international system, another category of challenges is significant, which determines either its “deepening” in internal affairs or its “elevation” over the prevailing national-state imperatives of foreign policy. We outline three groups of problems here. Let's start with the question of how internal issues and international relations should relate to each other. And again, recall: discussions on this subject - both conceptual and at the level of practical politics - are by no means related to something new. At the same time, it must be admitted that today this subject itself is acquiring a very sharp articulation. Particularly serious are the collisions around sovereignty and the “color revolutions”.

At one extreme, there is a minimalist and even prohibitive approach to external interference in the internal affairs of states, since it can be an expression of the aggressive efforts of some participants in international life, their desire for dominance. On the other is the thesis about the growing influence of processes that are transnational in nature, about the deepest (and growing) connection of problem situations within the country with the outside world and about the fundamental impossibility of isolating oneself from it with a blank wall.

Polemic battles can be fought on this basis - sometimes useful and sometimes not very fruitful (as if today they discussed with pathos why it is impossible to create a perpetual motion machine and how to create it all the same). But real (and often bloody) conflicts may arise. There is no need to establish a new world order in order to determine the ways to stop such conflicts. The direction in which a solution is possible has long been indicated - this is the adoption by the state of some obligations regarding the conformity of its internal development with certain criteria. Both the criteria and the obligations to comply with them can be formal, but it is much more important that they constitute a kind of “code of conduct” recognized de facto.

Perhaps, over time, this will become an increasingly common practice - as part of the development of an international system using a liberal algorithm. However, now in some of its segments the movement along this path has clearly stalled (or even gone in the opposite direction). And judging by many signs, this dynamics will determine the nature of the development of the international system for a long time. But even with the next change of vector, evolution in this direction will be very slow. But the likelihood of additional conflict on this basis is much higher. Modern life is replete with relevant examples - when, for example, external counterparties of a country affected by unrest interpret the events taking place in it from exactly opposite positions (as in the case of Ukraine and Syria) or when it is not possible to agree on measures that the international can and should take community (as is the case with Libya).

Thus, in modern conditions, “deepening” in the internal problems from the level of the international political system can have a conflictogenic character. And here comes the second question: can we assume that its “elevation” to the level of common challenges and global problems becomes an effective antithesis? Here, the emerging picture seems very ambiguous. On the one hand, the presence of common problems has

traditionally been considered and is considered an incentive for the consolidation of the international community, since the imperativeness of cooperative interaction in such areas where it is impossible to achieve significant results acting separately is obvious. And in practice, the field of international cooperation is expanding here. The list of keywords that indicate the areas of its development is constantly growing: ecology, climate, human health, migration, new technologies - but also terrorism, corruption, other forms of transnational criminal activity...

Optimists are convinced that the incentives for cooperation are so powerful that they will soon even make it possible to overcome the collapse of relations between Russia and the West, or at least somehow mix it. But skeptics have reason for pessimistic assessments and forecasts. Global problems and common challenges for all not only push states towards cooperation, but also create new contradictions between them. For example, they can exacerbate actual inequalities in technological capabilities (since leaders will always strive to tailor joint solutions to their interests and are by no means altruistic to share achievements with lagging ones). Or, different countries may have different relationships with their other priorities (as is now happening in the field of cybersecurity). And the already considerable experience in addressing such problems, although certainly positive, still does not indicate a qualitative breakthrough in the sense of impact on the international system. For example, the issue of combating international terrorism - contrary to expectations - has not become a powerful driver for joint action.

We define this as a phenomenon of sovereign particularism. We are talking about representations and political imperatives proceeding from the absolute value of sovereignty and the equally absolute prevalence of national (country) interests.

Today, this type of thinking and such a line in practical terms seems legitimate and natural to many. And how else to interpret the tasks of foreign policy, the goals of economic development, the conditions for ensuring security - if not through the unconditional priority of their own interests? There are many countries in which this roll is found. Its preservation and especially strengthening can affect the mentality in relation to the outside world. Putting particular motives in the first place and pushing into the background those that go beyond the framework of national-state pragmatism, are related to the problems of society in the broad sense of the word or have a solidarity character.

The arguments from the arsenal of “national egoism” can be quite successfully appealed in the propaganda struggle, since they do not require complex substantiation and are relatively easily supported within the country. Hence the attractive opportunities for the effective legitimization of relevant policies. Moreover, it is easy to justify it by appealing to sovereignty (“we do what we consider necessary, guided by national interests and resisting any external pressure”). The implications for the international system are obvious. As a result, there will be more and more prerequisites for international conflict, the search for mutually acceptable compromises will become more difficult, and the system itself will undergo dangerous stability tests. [1]

### **Methods.**

Article based on post-positivistic methodology of research in social science. Qualitative analysis made up by authors in previous article [1] used to introduce situation and this article is logical continuation of mentioned article.

Analysis supplemented with survey. Survey’s sample included Kazakhstani HEI academic staff and students the most highly progressive-minded and carriers of updated information on the worldwide situation, whose could adequately assess the current situation. Respondents of the survey are people of different ages between 18-60, occupations, education level, and income levels. The survey was conducted in the online form. For this purpose, there was developed a specially structured questionnaire with the support of the professional social science.

The aim of the survey is to collect information on the level of knowledge of situation, opinion, and perception on the influence of situation to Kazakhstan and individual level, and assessment of possible direct involvement of Kazakhstan to the situation. Hypothesis of survey is significant influence of global processes to Kazakhstan’s policy, economy and ordinary life of Kazakhstan citizens.

Respondents asked for 10 questions:

q01 - *“Which respondent status is best suit for you?”*;

q02 - *“How aware are you on the US-Russia relations difficulties?”*;

q03 - *“Which manifestations of the US-Russia relations difficulties you can mention?”*;

- q04 - “Do you think that the US-Russia relations difficulties affects Kazakhstan?”;  
 q05 - “Will the US-Russia relations difficulties make Kazakhstan's relations with other countries difficult?”;  
 q06 - “Is it difficult for Kazakhstan to build a multi-vector foreign policy with the Russian Federation, China, the USA in the context of the US-Russia relations difficulties?”;  
 q07 - “Does the echoes of the US-Russia relations difficulties affect Kazakhstan’s domestic politics and economy?”;  
 q08 - “Does the US-Russia relations difficulties affects your ordinary life?”;  
 q09 - “Describe your attitude to the US-Russia relations difficulties”;  
 q10 - “Assess the likelihood of Kazakhstan’s direct involvement to a possible escalation of US-Russia relations due to its geopolitical situation”.


Results of Survey examined by Chi-square test of Pirson for variables dependence and made conclusion based on dependence of questions and frequency of responses. Chi squared test examines existence of significant difference between observing and expected frequency. Further Chi squared test examines dependence of 2 variables. Zero hypothesis approves that variables are independent from each other in case of confirmation of expected frequency. In case of difference from expected frequency – Zero hypothesis rejecting and accepts alternative hypothesis that approves that variables are dependent.

**Results.**

Chi squared test shows dependence of: 1) q01-q04, q01-q05, q01-q06, q01-q06, q01-q07, q01-q08 and q01-q10, which means that status of respondents is factor for deeper knowledge of US-Russia relations and it is impact to Kazakhstan; 2) q02-q04, q02-q05, q02-q06, q02-q07, q02-q08, q02-q09 and q02-q10, which means that awareness on US-Russia relations helps to determine and describe it is influence on Kazakhstan.

A chi-square test of independence showed that there was no significant association between respondent status and respondent attitude to US-Russia relations difficulties; respondent awareness on US-Russia relations difficulties and manifestation of them.

Hypothesis of survey as significant influence of global processes to Kazakhstan’s policy, economy and ordinary life of Kazakhstan citizens had confirmed.



Picture 1. Diagram of respondents manifestations of US-Russia relations’ difficulties

Manifestations of US-Russia relations’ difficulties by respondents are follows: sanction wars – 2/3; cyber war – 1/2; trade war – 1/3; espionage – 1/4; alteration of spheres of influence, nuclear war and armed conflict – 1/8 (see Pic.1).

Overall impact of US-Russia relations’ difficulties to Kazakhstan feels 3/5 of respondents and 2/3 of respondents think that it could bring difficulties to relations of Kazakhstan with other countries, but 2/3 of

respondents think that Kazakhstan will follow for its multi-vector foreign policy without influence of US-Russia relations' difficulties.

US-Russia relations' difficulties could affect Kazakhstan's domestic politics, economy and ordinary life of Kazakhstan citizens think 2/5 respondents.

It is noteworthy that 2/5 of the respondents are neutral while 1/2 of respondents are negative about the complexity of the US-Russia relations.

Finally, 2/3 of respondents assessed that Kazakhstan in middle range of direct involvement to the possible escalation of US-Russia relations.

#### **Conclusion.**

The debate about whether the existing world order is good or bad and whether its alternative options are possible, in our turbulent, time full of changes, is probably inevitable. In them, it seems, it is important to have three key characteristics of the world order in the focus of analytical attention: its stability, efficiency, and maturity. The key to stability of any world order is its successful functioning. The most important indicator of effectiveness is the ability to adequately respond to the challenges that arise in the process of international political development. And a sign of maturity is the ability of participants to minimize those problems that cannot be resolved, to keep themselves from panic on this basis and to aim for constructive interaction to maintain international stability.

Summarizing survey results, authors comes to conclusion that Kazakhstani economy and policy, as well as ordinary citizen's lifestyle quite connected to the trends and tendency of US-Russia relations. Paradoxically, foreign policy of Kazakhstan does not depend on US-Russia relations.

Kazakhstan needs systematic changes of economy and policy does not depend on second parties and beneficial use of forming new global order.

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**FTAMP 04.71.21**

<https://doi.org/10.51889/2020-4.1728-8940.29>

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## **ҰЛЫ ОТАН СОҒЫСЫНАН КЕЙІНГІ ЖЫЛДАРДАҒЫ ШАРУАЛАРДЫҢ ӘЛЕУМЕТТІК СТРАТИФИКАЦИЯСЫ**

### *Аңдатпа*

Ұлы Отан соғысының аяқталуы халық үшін жаңа өмірге деген үмітін оятты. Елдің экономикасы соғыстың кесірінен қатты зардап шекті. Соғыс жылдарында үкіметтің негізгі назары ауыр өнеркәсіптің қалыпты жұмыс істеуінде болды. Себебі соғысты жүргізу үшін қару-жарақ, ауыр техника қажет болды. Сол себепті жұмысшылардың еңбегіне, олардың әлеуметтік жағдайына баса назар аударылды. Ауыл шаруашылығының дамуы да мемлекет назарында болды. Бірақ ауыл шаруашылығында еңбек етіп жүрген шаруалардың әлеуметтік жағдайына сын көтермеді. Соғыс аяқталғаннан кейінде шаруалардың ауыр еңбегі өз деңгейінде бағаланбады.

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