The aim of this study is to analyze the institutional nature of the post-authoritarian power transition in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and the substantive logic of the announced political reforms from the perspective of comparative politics. In the post-personalist period, the reforms initiated by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Shavkat Mirziyoyev have been presented in official discourse as renewal and political modernization. However, evaluating these reforms solely at the level of declared normative commitments is insufficient. This article examines the reforms in a comprehensive manner through the evolution of political discourse, legal and institutional restructuring, and changes in actual governance practices.

The theoretical framework of the analysis draws on the concepts of authoritarian adaptation and elite reproduction. The study demonstrates that the substance of the power transition has been oriented more toward the reconfiguration of regime stability than toward democratic institutionalization.

In this context, the notion of “reform” functions not as a mechanism for expanding structural pluralism but as an instrument for reaffirming elite agreements and redistributing power resources. This process reveals an internal contradiction between the rhetoric of liberalization and the practice of centralized control.

We interpret this dynamic as an institutionalized form of “managed liberalization”: while the discourse of change becomes a tool of legitimation, the structural constraints on political competition remain intact. The study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of regime transformation in Central Asia and refines the conceptual framework for analyzing authoritarian transitions.