This article analyzes how strategic autonomy developed in Central Asia from 2018 to 2025 through regional institution building, water-energy interdependence, border settlement, and diversification of external ties. It examines the conditions under which resource asymmetry impedes cooperation or creates room for agreement. The research design combines structured, focused comparison with process tracing. The evidence covers four episodes: the Consultative Meetings of Central Asian heads of state, the Kambarata-1 project, the Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreement, and the expansion of external partnerships after 2022. Official documents and peer-reviewed scholarship are assessed for continuity of decisions, depth of coordination, distribution of costs and benefits, and alternatives to concentrated dependence. The consultative format has acquired procedural continuity without supranational authority. Evidence from the water-energy and border cases indicates that the effects of asymmetry depend on institutional arrangements. Opaque information, weak compensation, and unilateral control sustain mistrust, whereas complementary interests and joint implementation make agreement more credible. Geopolitical change after 2022 increased the pace of coordination, building on domestic conditions established earlier. The article defines strategic autonomy as institutional capacity to widen collective choice and manage interdependence. ASEAN serves as a limited comparative reference rather than an organizational model for Central Asia.